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The purpose of this report is to provide historical perspective to the work and
recommendations of the Commission. In most cases the issues studied by the Commission are
identified and historical analysis is provided. The primary contributors to this work were Pat
Ooley, graduate student of Public History at the University of California at Santa Barbara and
Amanda Meeker, graduate student at California State University, Sacramento. As archive
researchers for the Secretary of State's California State Archives, they made a substantial
contribution to the understanding of the history of the many issues faced by the Commission.
Their work was greatly appreciated. Two additional papers have been included: one deals
with the fiscal system and the major changes that took place in 1933 and the other deals with
the troubled history of the place of cities in California government structure.
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STATE GOVERNANCE
by Pat Ooley

An Overview of the History of Constitutional
Provisions Dealing with State Governance
Although California's constitution has
undergone wholesale revision and amendment
since its inception in 1849, the work of the
original framers remains imprinted in the
organic law of the state. Responding to the
urgencies of their time, the elected delegates
who revised the constitution in 1879 expanded
the document, adding nine new articles and
some 8,000 words. Between 1966 and 1974,
California voters authorized significant
constitutional revisions recommended by the
Constitution Revision Commission and
proposed by the legislature. Since the
introduction of the popular initiative in 1911,
California voters have approved over 425
amendments to the 1879 constitution. After
significant revision and substantial amendment,
and notwithstanding the inclusion of popular
legislation, the fundamental organization of
state government provided for in
1849-executive, legislative, and judicial
division of powers-remains intact. The
purpose of this essay is to trace the
development of sections of the Executive,
Legislative and Initiative articles of the state
constitution to their historic beginnings in
California, hopefully revealing in the process
the intent of both framers and revisionists. 1

established laws of an acquired province must
remain in force until superseded by a formally
enacted state government. The time-tested
systems of locally governing alcaldes and
out-of-court arbitration of disputes had been
successfully applied in Alta California since the
Spanish administration. But what had
functioned as government for a sparsely
populated territory of Mexico's far northern
frontier amounted to anarchy for the litigious,
land-hungry Americans who were continuously
arriving in gold-rush California. By the summer
of 1849, the situation had become critical?

The forty-eight men who met in Monterey in
September of 1849 framed a.constitution for
California in just forty-three days. They were in
a hurry. Congress, embroiled and divided over
slave versus free soil, had repeatedly failed to
grant California territorial status. Californians,
unable to organize a constitutional government
without such authorization, were living under
the laws existing in California at the time of the
American annexation-a frontier application of
Mexican civil law. International law, and the
United States Supreme Court, held that the

Although the Congressional debate over
California's entrance as a free state edged the
country closer to civil war and secured
statehood only through sectionalist compromise
(Compromise of September 9, 1850), California
had at last acquired a constitutional
government. As provided in Section Six of
Article XIII, the constitution would become the
organic law of the state when popularly ratified.
By November 13, 1849, California voters had
ratified the constitution and installed their first
elected Governor, Lieutenant Governor,

President of the United States Zachary Taylor
suggested a solution for California: frame a
constitution and petition Congress directly for
immediate statehood when it next convened.
That is what California did. In just nine months
(June 1849 to March 1850), Californians elected
delegates to a constitutional convention; framed,
distributed, and ratified a constitution; and
elected a first legislature, which then elected
two Senators to Congress. With constitutions in
hand, Senators William M. Gwin and John C.
Fremont, along with two popularly elected
Representatives, petitioned Congress for
statehood. 3
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Legislature, and members of the House of
Representatives. 4
Aware of the urgency to get the ratified
document before Congress in time for its next
session, but equally aware of the significance of
their responsibility to their constituents and to
posterity, the 1849 framers worked rapidly and
diligently. Their principal reference, besides
their individual political and legal expertise,
was a "book of constitutions" containing the
constitutions of the thirty United States and the
federal constitution. Drawing primarily from the
constitutions of Iowa and New York, and
secondarily from the constitutions of Louisiana,
Wisconsin, Michigan, Texas, and Mississippi, the
delegates assembled a new treatise that reflected
both contemporary political thought and the
proven practices of other states with similar
histories and experiences. When necessary, the
delegates tailored laws to fit California's
peculiar circumstances. 5
In the thirty years that passed between 1849 and
the constitutional convention of 1878-79,
California and the nation had endured profound
transformation. By the early 1870s, the United
States had only recently emerged from the
trauma of civil war and presidential
assassination. Freed from wartime occupations,
yet spurred on by wartime industry particularly
in the north, the United States resumed its
prewar expansion at an unprecedented pace.
The nation had plunged headlong into the
tumult that has historically marked the final
three decades of nineteenth-century, maturing
America: the opening and taking up of the
"public domain" in the west, the exploitation of
what seemed an inexhaustible supply of natural
resources, construction and expansion of a
mighty railroad network, the arrival of five
million foreign immigrants since 1850,
industrialization and urbanization, and the
financial crash and depression of 1873.6
The civil war had provided two important
catalysts for .change in America-the ascendancy
of the Republican party, and a proven federal
supremacy over the states. Bolstered by federal
laissez faire acquiescence and supported by
federal grants, GOP industrialists and
Page 4 -State Governance

capitalists, such as the "Big Four" owners of the
Southern Pacific Railroad in California,
determined economic policy. A new corporate
order had emerged for America, with significant
social and political implications. Capitalist and
industrialist expansion produced a large
laboring class concurrently with a class of
opulent wealth. The depression of 1873-78
reduced many laborers to poverty. 7
Holding to the doctrine that governments ruled
by the consent of the governed, and that people
instituted governments for their own benefit,
citizens looked to government for remedy. But
people increasingly perceived both federal and
local government as corrupt and indecisive-the
pawn of corporations and private interests
whose unchecked speculations had triggered the
financial crash and depression. The perception
was not unfounded. Popular newspapers had
implicated congressional and cabinet level
officials in the Union Pacific-Credit Mobilier
scandal (1872), and the Whiskey Ring bribery
and tax evasion case (1874). State and municipal
governments were even more seriously infected
with the fraud and graft of party machines
operating in such cities as New York (Tammany
Hall), Philadelphia, Chicago, and Washington,
D.C. In the west, settlers and newspapers
accused federally appointed territorial
governors and judges of acting in collusion with
corporations and developers in the squandering
of public lands. Territorial legislatures, such as
Dakota's, were said to be cpntrolled by the
railroads. 8
By the mid 1870s, reform movements were
coalescing across the nation. Organized labor,
agrarian assoCiations, and women's suffrage
groups were demanding, among other things,
restrictions on the powers of state legislatures,
and government regulation of corporations and
monopolies. Reformers turned to government
regulation, restriction, and limitation as means
to an end. To the chagrin of more conservative
elements, the instruments through which they
enacted their reforms were their state
constitutions. Beginning in 1872 and
culminating during the Progressive era in 1913,
constitutional conventions were revising and

--------------------------------~
amending the fundamental law in at least
twenty-six states. California's new state
constitution of 1879 was one of many. 9
In the published debates of the 1849
constitutional convention, delegates repeatedly
stated that the fundamental law of a state
should be brief, with most verbiage dedicated to
delineating and restricting state powers, and to
the distribution of power. Laws of a statutory
nature, or laws of only contemporary
significance, were best consigned to the statute
books. The zealous revisionists of 1879,
however, established a precedent for allowing
statutory material to find its way into the
constitution. The reform-driven necessity to
instruct and restrict the legislature,
municipalities, local governments, and
corporations repealed the canon of
constitutional brevity. Like other revised state
constitutions, California's constitution increased
in length-from approximately 7,300 to about
15,000 words in 1879. 10
In his 1930 study of the California 1878-79
Constitutional Convention, political scientist
Carl Brent Swisher concluded that most of the
reforms so earnestly expounded by the 1879
revisionists went largely "unrealized" after the
adoption of the new constitution. At the 1879
fall elections, liberal and Workingmen reformers
divided among themselves allowing a
conservative Republican sweep of the legislature
and executive branch. The 1880 legislature " 'of
indefinite postponements'" effectively
"sabotaged legislation proposed for the purpose
of carrying into effect provisions of the
constitution which were inimical to conservative
interests." The prized Railroad Commission
"proved as clay in the hands of the great
corporations." Astute attorneys delayed
enactment for many years of the provisions for
taxing railroads by challenging them as
unconstitutional in the courts. Corporations,
including the Wells Fargo Express Company,
brought suit challenging the Board of
Equalization's power to equalize assessments
and won. The provision which made lobbying a
felony "was little more than a laughing
stock." 11

Proponents of reform had championed a new
constitution for California, but after 1879, "the
conservative interests by one means or another
continued to play a dominant part in California
law and politics." Even so, observed Swisher,
"agitation did not cease ... for the interests of
great numbers of the people were too vitally
affected for that." 12
For the nation, industrialization, capitalist
expansion, and corporate growth persisted.
Immigrants continued to arrive, expanding the
labor force and intensifying urbanization. In
1893, a depression more devastating than 1873
settled on the country. Unemployed workers
who marched to Washington for sympathy and
redress met with government indifference and
city police. By 1900, however, capital growth
and investment had pulled the nation from
depression. Corporate mergers created huge
business entities, headed by men of fabulous
wealth and powerY
Contrasted with the opulence, however, were
the urban ghettos of the working poor, the
drudgery and danger of factory work, and child
labor. Over time the reform impulse of the 1870s
spread from labor and agrarians to urban
intellectuals and activists, social workers, and a
growing American middle-class. The new
"Progressive" proponents of reform found
expression in art, literature, muckrake
journalism, and public forums. Beginning at
municipal and state levels, the broad reforms of
the Progressive movement gathered momentum
as state after state enacted Progressive
legislation. As governor of New York,
Republican Theodore Roosevelt had successfully
sponsored Progressive reforms. As President
(1901 to 1909), Roosevelt helped bring
Progressivism to the nationallevel. 14
South Dakota was the first state to adopt the
initiative and referendum in 1898. By 1910,
Utah, Oregon, Montana, Oklahoma, Missouri,
Michigan, Arkansas, and Colorado had
duplicated South Dakota's reform enactment. By
1910, the Progressive movement had gained
enough authority in California to elect a "reform
governor," Republican Hiram Johnson, and a
Progressive legislature. On February 9, 1911,
State Governance -Page 5
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Senate Constitutional Amendment 22, providing
for the initiative and referendum, passed the
Senate by a vote of thirty-five to one. The
Assembly approved SCA 22 by a vote of
seventy-two to zero one week later. At a special
election held on October 10, 1911, California
voters ratified the amendment to Section One of
Article IV of the constitution by a vote of
168,744 to 52,093. 15
Although it was not the intent of the
Progressives, their "direct legislation" reforms
exacerbated the constitutional brevity problem
in California. The initiative process made the
constitution much easier to amend. As a
consequence, each election year's ballot added
more statutory law to the constitution
(excepting 1915, 1935, and 1939 when
amendments were proposed but none ratified).
Issues passionately supported by one generation
became irrelevant to the next. Once etched into
the organic law, however, enactments are not
easily removed. By 1948, California's
constitution had increased to 95,000 words. 16
Concurrent with the unbridled growth of the
constitution came ballot measures asking
Californians if a convention to revise the
constitution should be called. In 1898, 1914,
1920, and 1930 voters rejected the propositions.
In December, 1930, the California Constitutional
Commission established by Governor C. C.
Young, reported that "constant amendment"
of the organic law had:
produced an instrument bad in form,
inconstant in particulars, loaded with
unnecessary detail, encumbered with
provisions of no permanent value, and
replete with matter which might more
properly be contained in the statute law
of the state.
The Commission unanimously voted for
revision. 17
In 1934, Californians approved the call for a
constitutional convention by a vote of 705,915 to
668,080. Interestingly, revisionists in California
and in other states were asking for reforms
similar to those of the present commission.
According to a 1934 Bureau of Public
Page 6 -State Governance

Administration fact-finding report for the
California legislature, proposals included: more
signatures required for initiative constitutional
amendment than for initiative statute; adoption
of a single-house legislature, new legislative
sessions, and a closer relationship between the
governor and the legislature (as promoted by
the National Municipal League); elimination of
any references to executive officers, except
elected officials; "changes in the machinery" of
county consolidation; an elective State Board of
Education; and "alterations" in constitutional
mandates regarding state allotments to schools.
The legislature, failing to comply with the
initiative directive, never provided for the
convention. 18
By the mid 1940s, many Californians, including
citizen's groups and members of the legislative,
judicial, and executive branches of government,
were again critically assessing the condition of
the state's fundamental law document. In 1947,
the legislature established an Interim
Commission for the Revision of the California
Constitution, composed of ten State Senators
and ten members of the Assembly. Governor
Earl Warren appointed a 300-member Citizen's
Advisory Committee, which he instructed to
investigate and address constitutional revision
in statewide public hearings, and then report to
the Interim Commission. 19
Alonzo L. Baker, political scientist and legal
scholar who served on the Citizen's Advisory
Committee, recalled that when the committee
reported to the legislature in 1948, many
members recommended "thorough and
far-reaching revision." But, he added, "the
twenty members from the Legislature who held
the residual power would brook no such thing."
Regarding the Legislative Interim Commission,
Baker concluded:
The only accomplishment of note done
by this Interim Commission was to
recommend taking out the 14,500 words
providing for the San Francisco
Panama-Pacific Exposition of 1915.
Inasmuch as we were acting one-third of
a century after that Exposition closed it
was thought it would do no violence to

---------------------------------~
the Constitution to eliminate the section!
To be sure, such a portion of the
Constitution was non-constitutional to
begin with: it was a travesty on
constitution-making to put it there in the
first place. But such is life in California
when it comes to its basic State
document. 20
The reform movement did not go away, and, by
the 1960s, various states were revising their
constitutions. California, however, had first to
hurdle the obstacle of legislative resistance to a
constitutional convention. Both the 1849 and
1879 framers had provided for major
constitutional revision only by calling a
constitutional convention (1849 Article X,
Section Two, amended in 1853, and 1879 Article
XVIII, Section Two). The California Legislature
obviated the necessity of a convention by
securing voter approval to amend Article XVIII,
Amending and Revising the Constitution. The
amendment authorized the legislature to act as
a constitutional convention, allowing it to
submit its own revisions to the electors for
ratification. In November of 1962, California
voters approved Proposition 7 (Assembly
Constitutional Amendment No. 14, Statutes,
1961, Resolution Chapter 222) by a vote of
--2,901,537 to 1,428,034. 21
Why had the legislature repeatedly resisted a
constitutional convention? Baker contended that
"the issue of apportionment of seats in the State
and Federal Legislatures" was "the greatest
single barrier to the much-needed revision of
State Constitutions." Indeed, the 1934 Bureau of
Public Administration report listed the
"problem of apportioning the legislature" as an
issue for constitutional revision?2
In almost every state, legislatures reapportioned
their own districts. Following the federal
two-house model, many legislatures based
representation in their lower houses on
population, and in their upper houses on
geography or counties. In addition, many states
had not accounted for the great shift of
populations from rural to urban areas in their
apportionments, and had not reapportioned

since the turn of the century. As a result city
dwellers had become severely underrepresented
at the state and federal levels. Why would a
state legislature resist reapportionment? As
Baker succinctly described it in 1964:
politicians and office holders in many
State Legislatures and in the
Congress . . . have been elected to office
from grossly malapportioned districts.
Many of whom know their jobs are at
stake, for in Congressional redistricting
and in reapportionment of seats in the
State Houses many incumbents will be
on the outside looking in; their base of
political operations "back home" will be
considerably altered; perhaps swept
away altogether?3
As citizens or local government officials who
petitioned for equal apportionment were
repeatedly rebuffed by their state legislatures,
they appealed to the courts. Several landmark
Supreme Court decisions, culminating with
Reynolds v. Sims (377 U.S. 533) in 1964,
mandated a "both houses" rule for all state
legislatures. Under the "equal protection" clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, both houses of a
state legislature had to be based on population.
By 1964, the Supreme Court had ordered "both
house" reapportionment in the states of
Tennessee, Georgia, Alabama, New York,
Maryland, Delaware, and Virginia. Although
previous decisions handed down by the
"liberal" Warren Court had disgruntled some
Americans (school prayer, obscenity cases,
school desegregation), a popular majority
concurred with the "one person, one vote"
doctrine. 24
California's 1849 and 1879 constitutions had
each provided for popular representation in
both houses of the legislature. The legislature
was to determine districts, and to reapportion
after every federal decennial census. The 1879
constitution allowed one county to contain more
than one district if the size of the population
dictated (and the legislature would have to
determine that fact), but no county could unite
with another county to form one district. As we
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have seen, by 1879 the process of urbanization
in California had begun, but it had not achieved
the massive proportions yet to come?5
By 1960, while California's far northern counties
of Alpine, Inyo, and Mono contained a
combined population of 14,240, Los Angeles
County had achieved urban sprawl with a
population of 6,011,140 people. Even so, the
state constitution still provided that no county
could have more than one senator, and no
senator could represent more than three
counties. Calling California's Senate "the most
grotesquely malapportioned in all the United
States," Baker predicted in 1964 that the
Supreme Court would "not long endure the
present rank discrimination against California
voters wherein one vote in the 28th Senatorial
District (Alpine, Inyo, and Mono Counties) is
worth 400 times as much as a vote in the
38th District (Los Angeles County)." 26
Following the Supreme Court rulings and based
on a federal district court ruling that California's
Senate was unconstitutionally apportioned
(Silver v. Jordan, 241, F. Supp. 576, S.D. Cal.
1964), the California Supreme Court ruled that
both the Assembly and Senate had to
reapportion by population (Silver v. Brown, 63
Cal. 2nd 270). In October of 1965, the California
Legislature passed Assembly Bill No. 1 which
fashioned new Assembly and Senate districts.
The California Supreme Court later ruled that
California's congressional districts, as drawn in
1961, were also unconstitutional and ordered
reapportionment (Silver v. Reagan, 67 Cal. 2nd
452). Following the guidelines proposed by the
United States Supreme Court, the California
Legislature reapportioned its congressional
districts in 1967?7
By the 1966 elections, California had complied
with the court ordered redistricting of Assembly
and Senate districts. As Larry N. Gerston and
Terry Christensen have observed, the new
reapportionment "shifted half of the senate's
seats from rural northern areas to southern and
urban locations." California's 1966 legislature,
with "twenty-two new senators and thirty-three
first-term Assembly members," was "younger,
Page 8 -State Governance

better educated ... more ideological," and not
quite as white?8
The California Legislature created the
Constitution Revision Commission with
Assembly Concurrent Resolutions No. 77 and
No. 7 in 1963 (Statutes, 1963, Resolution Chapter
181, and First Extraordinary Session, Resolution
Chapter 7). The Assembly established the
commission, administered by the Joint
Committee on Legislative Organization, in order
to implement the provisions of Proposition 7
(November, 1962). The resolutions provided for
a commission consisting of the Joint Committee
on Legislative Organization, who would appoint
not more than fifty citizen-members, three
Senators, appointed by the Senate Rules
Committee, and three Assembly Members,
appointed by the Speaker. 29
To facilitate its labor the Commission
subdivided into article-committees which
examined and revised the constitution
article-by-article. Each committee reported its
findings to the Commission which, acting as a
Committee of the Whole, considered and finally
adopted individual committee reports. The
Constitution Revision Commission, which sat
from 1964 to 1974, submitted two major reports
of recommended revisions to the Legislature in
1966 and 1968. 30
Beginning with Proposition 1A in November of
1966, over the next nine year, the Legislature
submitted fourteen constitutional amendments
to the voters for their approval. Each ballot
measure, encompassing the legislatureapproved recommendations of the Constitution
Revision Commission, proposed amendments to
individual articles or groups of articles of the
constitution. All but four of the propositions
passed at the polls. Its work completed, the
legislature dissolved the Constitution Revision
Commission in 1974
(Joint Rules Committee Resolution 57,
March 4, 1974)?1
California and its constitution have weathered
many changes in 146 years. Throughout,
reformers and revisionists have seen fit to retain
the basic organization of state government

----------------------------~
provided for in the 1849 organic law. Reform
and revision have, however, established two
precedents for California that contradict the
constitutional tenets of the original framers.
Triggered by the 1879 revision and heightened
by the 1911 "direct legislation" reforms,
statutory law disorders the document. In 1964,
Alonzo Baker reported in 1964 that seventy-five
per cent of the California Constitution contained
extraneous, non-constitutional material. The
1966-1974 Constitution Revision Commission
amendments tidied the clutter, but between 1974
and 1993 voters approved ninety-seven of 151
proposed constitutional amendments. A voter
trend since 1990 has been to reject most
propositions at the polls, but motivation seems
to stem from the question "How much will this

cost?" rather than "Does this really belong in
the constitution?" 32
The second contradictory precedent was born of
the need to correct the first-wholesale revision
without convening a constitutional convention.
Article X, Section Two of the 1849 Constitution
and Article XVIII, Section Two of the 1879
'
Constitution provided for constitutional revision
only by means of a constitutional convention.
With voter approval in 1962, the California
Legislature amended the constitution to allow
for legislature-constructed, partial revision. Like
its 1963 predecessor, the California Constitution
Revision Commission (established Statutes 1993,
Chapter 1243, SB 16) is instructed to discover
the defects of and recommend the needed
reforms to certain provisions of the fundamental
law of the state.

State Governance- Page 9

Page 10- State Governance

---------------------------------~

The Executive Branch
Governor's Powers and the
Lieutenant Governor
The original framers made provision for a
popularly elected Lieutenant Governor in
Article V (Executive Department) of the 1849
Constitution. Section sixteen provided for the
election, length of term, and qualifications for
the office (the same as the Governor), as well as
for succession to the office of Governor in case
of any disability of the Lieutenant Governor
(President pro tempore of the Senate). Section
seventeen stipulated the causes for the transfer
of the powers and duties of the executive to the
Lieutenant Governor such as resignation or
death, and including absence from the state.
The twenty-member Committee on the
Constitution appears to have used the 1846
constitution of New York as a model for the two
sections because they are almost verbatim
reproductions of sections six and seven of
Article IV of that document. The California
delegation adopted sections sixteen and
seventeen of Article IV as reported by the
committee, without debate, during both
Committee of the Whole and second reading
consideration of the executive article. At the
final reading of Article V, "one or two verbal
errors corrected, and the article then passed" for
enrollment in the constitution. 33
At the 1878-79 revision, sections sixteen and
seventeen, which had not been amended since
their construction, became sections fifteen and
sixteen of Article IV (Executive Department) of
the 1879 document. In its report of the executive
article, the Committee on the Executive
Department had revised only the first of the two
sections by adding a final clause stipulating that
the Lieutenant Governor could not hold another
office during his term. The second section,
providing for the transfer of power and duties,
remained unchanged from 1849.

During Committee of the Whole consideration
of the executive article, delegate James
O'Sullivan attempted to strike out the new
clause that had been added to section fifteen by
the Committee on the Executive Department,
but the house rejected his proposal. The
convention adopted both sections fifteen and
sixteen without further debate in Committee of
the Whole, or during the first and second
convention readings of the executive article? 4
The 1879 framers had preserved the 1849
provisions for a popularly elected Lieutenant
Governor who assumed the powers and duties
of the executive when the Governor was out of
the state. In 1879 at least twenty-two other state
constitutions provided for a popularly elected
Lieutenant Governor, and the same number of
state constitutions stipulated the transfer of
power when the Governor was out of the state.
At the November 8, 1898, election voters
approved Proposition Five (ACA 36), which
amended sections fifteen and sixteen of Article
V of the constitution. That portion of section
fifteen, which provided for succession to the
executive office (Lieutenant Governor, President
pro tempore of the Senate), became part of
section sixteen and was extended to include a
third level of succession, Speaker of the
Assembly. The 1879 revision of section fifteen,
which prohibited the Lieutenant Governor from
holding another office during his term, was
deleted. Section sixteen retained the provision
for the transfer of powers and duties to the
Lieutenant Governor when the Governor left the
state. Voters again amended section sixteen in
1946 (Prop. 14, ACA 4), 1948 (Prop. 9, ACA 14),
and 1958 (Prop. 7, ACA 5). Each amendment
affected provisions of the section regarding
succession to the office of governor.

State Governance- Page 11
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The Constitution Revision Commission reported
their recommendations for the executive Article
V to the legislature in 1966. As proposed by the
Article V Committee, the Commission deleted
some "unnecessary" words and shortened
section fifteen (new section eight) to two
sentences: "The Lieutenant Governor shall have
the same qualifications as the Governor. He is
President of the Senate but has only a casting
vote." Provision for the election of the
Lieutenant Governor would be incorporated
with section sixteen materials in new section
nine?5
The section sixteen order of succession to the
executive office had, by 1966, been amended to
(1)Lieutenant Governor, (2) President pro
tempore of the Senate, (3) Speaker of the
Assembly, (4) Secretary of State, and (5)
Attorney General. In the new section nine, the
Commission deleted the line of succession,
allowing the legislature to determine "an order
of precedence after the Lieutenant Governor."
The Commission retained, without comment,
the provision that the Lieutenant Governor
"shall act as Governor" during the "absence
from the state" of the Governor. 36
Although they retained the instruction that "The
Lieutenant Governor shall become Governor
when a vacancy occurs in the office of
Governor," the Commission noted that the
constitution contained no provision for
determining disability of the Governor, or the
existence of a vacancy. "Concluding that
decisions on these matters should be, as far as
possible, free from political pressures," the final
clause of section nine stated: "The Supreme
Court has exclusive jurisdiction to determine all
questions arising under this section." 37
The legislature presented to the voters in
Proposition 1A (ACA 13), the exact
recommendations of the Constitution Revision
Commission, except that they numbered the
new sections nine and ten and added a final
clause to section ten. After allowing for the
Supreme Court's exclusive jurisdiction to
determine all questions, the new section
concluded: "Standing to raise questions of
vacancy or temporary disability is vested
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exclusively in a body provided by statute." On
November 8, 1966, Californians ratified
Proposition 1A by a vote of 4,156,416 to
1,499,675. 38
On November 5, 1974, voters ratified
Proposition 11 (ACA 99) which amended
sections nine and ten of Article V. The
amendments deleted the gender specific
pronouns "he" and "his," substituting the
gender neutral"The Lieutenant Governor," and
the possessive "Governor's" in their place.
Sections nine and ten of Article V, Executive,
have not been amended since 1974. 39
Research indicates that the issues before the
present Constitution Revision Commission
relating to the Lieutenant
Governor-Governor's powers and duties
passing to the Lieutenant Governor when the
Governor leaves the state, and the separate
elections of the Governor and Lieutenant
Governor-have not been historically debated.
The provisions in question, which date back to
the 1849 Constitution, have not, until recently,
been "issues." Since the first statewide elections
in 1849, California voters have elected
Governors and Lieutenant Governors of
different political parties concurrently only
seven times. More importantly, five of those
occasions include the last five gubernatorial
·elections since 1978.40
1886

Governor Washington Bartlett
Democrat
Lieutenant Governor Robert W. Waterman Republican

1894

Governor James H. Budd
Lieutenant Governor Spenser G. Millard

Democrat
Republican

1978

Governor Edmund G. Brown, Jr.
Lieutenant Governor Mike Curb

Democrat
Republican

1982

Governor George Deukmejian
Lieutenant Governor Leo T McCarthy

Republican
Democrat

1986

Governor George Deukmejian
Lieutenant Governor Leo T McCarthy

Republican
Democrat

1990

Governor Pete Wilson
Lieutenant Governor Leo T McCarthy

Republican
Democrat

1994

Governor Pete Wilson
Lieutenant Governor Gray Davis

Republican
Democrat

-----------------------------------~
Perhaps, as Gerston and Christensen have
suggested, the opposing-party phenomena can
be assigned to the relative weakness of the
Democratic and Republican parties in
California. Perhaps, as Gerston and Christensen
have suggested, the California electorate
perceives and uses the separate-ballot election of
Governor and Lieutenant Governor as a check
on the power of the Governor. Whatever the
cause or combination of causes, the trend is an
historically recent one. 41

The Superintendent of Public
Instruction and the State Board
of Education.
The original framers provided for a popularly
elected Superintendent of Public Instruction in
section one of Article IX, Education, of the 1849
Constitution. Section one instructed the
legislature to prescribe the election, duties, and
compensation of a Superintendent of Public
Instruction, who would serve a three-year term.
In 1851, the legislature established the office of
the Superintendent, and delineated the powers
and duties of the elected position (Statutes 1851,
Chapter 126, p. 491). In 1852, the legislature
established a State Board of Education
consisting of the Governor, Superintendent of
Public Instruction, and Surveyor General
(Statutes, 1852, Chapter 53, p. 117).
Section one of Article V, as reported by the
Committee on the Constitution at the 1849
constitutional convention, was copied from the
1844 Constitution of Iowa, Article X, Section
One. During Committee of the Whole
consideration of the Education Article, John
McDougal, delegate and future Governor of
California, proposed to amend section one "that
it be left to the Legislature to elect these
superintendents." Delegate Morton McCarver
responded that he "was decidedly in favor of
placing every thing in the hands of the people,
and particularly the subject of School
Commissioners." McDougal withdrew his
amendment and the house adopted the section
as reported. During the convention second and

third readings of the education article the house
adopted section one, as originally reported,
without debateY
In 1862, California voters ratified a legislative
amendment to section one of Article IX. The
amendment increased the Superintendent's term
of office to four years, and provided that the
Superintendent be elected at the special
elections for judicial officers (Statutes, 1862,
C]::lapter 317, pp. 434-35, 579, 586).
The 1879 framers maintained the provision for
an elected Superintendent of Public Instruction
in Article IX, Section Two of the new
constitution. The new section changed the time
of election to coincide with gubernatorial
elections, and specified compensation to be the
same as for the Secretary of State. Although the
State Board of Education had been in existence
since 1852, the 1879 framers did not specifically
cite it in the final draft of the article. Sections
three and seven of Article IX provided for the
election of county superintendents and local
boards of education.
During Committee of the Whole consideration
of section two as reported by the Committee on
Education, lengthy debate ensued regarding the
necessity of having a Superintendent of Public
Instruction, and also over the salary he should
be paid. Delegates such as William F. White,
who favored abolishing the office of
Superintendent, argued "in the interest of
economy." Thomas H. Laine, who called
superintendents "mere parasites," wanted to
reduce the salary below that of the Secretary of
State. The office had cost the state $16,000. over
the last two years. Volney Howard agreed that
the education system in California had been
"costing too much." John R. W. Hitchcock called
the office "superfluous" and a "waste of
money." Albert P. Overton complained that the
school system had cost the taxpayers three
million dollars and was "the ruination of the
State." 43
Delegate Joseph W. Winans, who chaired the
Committee on Education, cited seventeen other
state constitutions that specifically provided for
a popularly elected Superintendent of Public
State Governance- Page 13
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Education. Defending the section he argued that
California's school system, with about 150,000
youths enrolled, needed "a single executive
head." Alexander Campbell warned: "It will not
do to fritter away the powers of this officer, and
distribute them here and there at random." It
was "a false economy." Wilbur F. Heustis,
Charles W. Cross, Jacob R. Freud, Marion Biggs,
Eli T. Blackmer, and John T. Wickes defended
the office of Superintendent as a necessary,
laborious position of dignity, meriting a salary
equal to the Secretary of State. 44
James S. Reynolds, a member of the Committee
on Education, questioned the priorities of the
delegation:
Your committee [of the whole] has voted
to prevent the counties, cities, and
townships from contracting debts to
build any school houses at alt but give
them unlimited privileges of contracting
debts for Court Houses and jails .... You
have voted to increase the expense of the
judiciary from one to two hundred
thousand dollars per annum, and you
are opposed to increasing the expenses
of education. I will admit, sir, that this is
consistent, for if you are not going to
have any education you will need more
judiciary; you will need more Court
Houses, and you will need more jails.
Why sir, we had better go to work and
see how may more penitentiaries the
State can afford to build. You will want
some more penitentiaries.45
The Committee of the Whole finally rejected
Laine's proposal to cut the salary of the
Superintendent below that of the Secretary of
State, and Hitchcock's motion to strike the
section completely. Section two, as reported by
the Committee on Education, was adopted by
the convention. The house adopted the section
without amendment or further debate during
the convention first and second readings.
Section seven of Article IX as originally reported
by the Committee on Education provided for
the popular election of a State Board of
Education consisting of two members elected
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from each Congressional district. The
Superintendent of Public Instruction would be
ex officio President. Section eight delineated the
duties of the State Board of Education, including
adopting a series of textbooks, testing of
teachers, and granting of certificates. In
Committee of the Whole the convention deleted
section seven entirely, without debate. They
amended section eight (which then moved into
position as section seven) by eliminating
reference to the State Board of Education and
substituting local Boards of Education, Boards
of Supervisors, and County Superintendents.
The "school book question/' which had vexed
the legislature for some time (publishing
lobbies), was better left to local school boards
and county supervisors. 46
During the convention first reading, Blackmer
attempted to amend section seven again by
subjecting local decisions to the approval of the
legislature. Arguing unsuccessfully that the
section provided no uniformity or statewide
standards for textbooks or teachers
qualifications, Blackmer summarized: "This
Convention has decided to do away with the
State Board of Education. I voted against
striking that out . . . because, in my judgement,
it is a need of our system." The house rejected
Blackmer's amendment and concurred with
Committee of the Whole actions. 47
During the convention second reading,
delegates again made failed attempts to allow
legislative authority Thomas B. McFarland was
in favor of striking out section seven "and
leaving it to the Legislature to formulate a
system which this Convention has failed to do."
Morris M. Estee argued for a "State system"
with uniform rules, laws, and regulations. "The
educational interests of this State are the most
important interests in the state. We ought to
treat it with all the dignity that belongs to it."
Future Congressman Marion Biggs accused
Estee, who had argued against legislative
control of the Railroad Commission, of political
inconsistency. " 'Stand by your guns,' " he
quoted to Estee, " 'and keep your powder
dry.'" 48
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In 1884, a constitutional amendment repealed
section seven of Article IX and substituted a
provision similar to the original report of the
1879 Committee on Education. The State Board
of Education, consisting of the Governor,
Superintendent of Public Instruction, and the
principals of the state normal schools,
administered the publication and distribution of
a uniform series of textbooks. The legislature
gained authority over county Boards of
Education and county Superintendents. A 1912
amendment to section seven extended
legislative authority over the State Board of
Education. The Legislature would provide for
the election or appointment of a State Board of
Education.
In 1968 the Constitution Revision Commission
reported their proposed revisions for Article IX
to the Legislature. They noted that the
Superintendent of Public Instruction "is elected
statewide under existing provisions." The
Commission proposed that "the Legislature may
change the method of selection by two-thirds
vote of the members of each house." Regarding
the State Board of Education, the Commission
reported: "The Legislature's power to determine
the method of selection under existing
provisions is preserved under the proposaL
Statutes presently provide for the appointment
by the Governor with Senate approvaL" At the
November, 1968 elections, Proposition 1
(ACA 30), encompassing the Commission's
recommendations, failed at the polls. 49
California voters ratified Proposition 6 (ACA 60)
on June 2, 1970. The amendment, which favored
local choice of appropriate textbooks, reduced
section seven to "The Legislature shall provide
for the appointment or election of the State
Board of Education and a board of Education in
each county." (Proposition 8, 1976 added the
present provision for joint county boards).
Proposition 6 of 1970 also added the present
section 7.5 which provides that the State Board
of Education adopt textbooks for grades one
through eight statewide, to be furnished
without cost. Proposition 11 of 1974 repealed the
gender specific "he" and "his" from section two,
and Proposition 140 (Political Reform Initiative

of 1990) limited to not more than two the terms
of the Superintendent of Public Instruction. 50

Insurance Commissioner
Neither the 1849 nor the 1879 framers provided
for an Insurance Commissioner, appointed or
elected, in the California Constitution. The
Legislature had provided for the office of
Insurance Commissioner as early as 1868, but
the office did not become an elected one until
1988 when voters ratified Proposition 103.
Proposition 103, an initiative statute, added
Section 12900 to the Insurance Code which
provided for the popular election of an
Insurance Commissioner at gubernatorial
elections.
The history of the office of the Insurance
Commissioner is statutory rather than
constitutional. Chapter 300, which established
the office of Insurance Commissioner,
transferred the powers and duties relating to
insurance companies in California from the
State Controller to the new Commissioner
(Statutes, 1867-1868, Chapter 300, p. 336).
Insurance companies nominated the Insurance
Commissioner at statewide conventions. The
Governor either approved the nomination or
appointed another person to serve annually.
Section 368 of the Political Code, established in
1872, provided for an Insurance
Commissioner-an executive officer, appointed
by the Governor, subject. to the approval of the
Senate. In 1915, the Legislature amended
Political Code Section 368 to provide that the
Insurance Commissioner serve four-year terms.
Provisions for the Insurance Commissioner were
transferred from the Political Code to the
Insurance Code when it was established in 1935
(Statutes, 1935, Chapter 145).
According to the text of the initiative statute, the
"voter revolt" that lead to the construction and
passage of Proposition 103 in 1988 resulted from
"enormous increases in the cost of insurance,"
making insurance "unaffordable and
unavailable to millions of Californians."
Insurance "reform" was necessary because
existing laws "inadequately" protected
State Governance- Page 15
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consumers from the "excessive, unjustified, and
arbitrary rates" of insurance companies. In
addition to reforms such as rate roll backs, the
initiative provided for an "accountable"
Insurance Commissioner who would be
popularly elected. Section Four of the initiative
statute that added Section 12900 to the
Insurance Code, read: "12900 (a) The
commissioner shall be elected by the People in
the same place and manner and for the same
term as th e Governor. 51
II

The question of whether popular election
provides accountability or does not requires
further inquiry, but an instructional story of
Governor accountability is told in the
unprocessed papers of the Insurance
Commissioner at the California State Archives.
The Watts Riots in Los Angeles of August 11-17,
1965 had resulted in the destruction of
$140 million in property. 52 Soon after, business
owners in or near the affected area began
sending letters of complaint to the office of the
Insurance Commissioner. Citing reasons of
high-risk, insurance companies were cancelling
the property insurance of the business owners.
Similar riots had been set off in other cities in
the country. In those tense, volatile times
another riot could easily be sparked. In their
letters to the Commissioner business owners
explained that, without insurance, they risked
financial ruin.
The letters of reply from the Commissioner's
office asserted that he was unable to help the
business owners because the Commissioner did
not have that type of regulatory authority over
private insurance companies in California. The
rebuffed and desperate consumers then
petitioned the office of the person who, because
he had appointed the Commissioner, was
ultimately accountable. Correspondence began
. to appear from Governor Pat Brown to the
Insurance Commissioner inquiring about the
situation, and offering suggestions for remedy.
Administrative records of the Insurance
Commissioner indicate that the office had soon
established a review board and was considering
the cases of the business owners with cancelled
policies on an individual basis.
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State Treasurer
Section Eighteen of Article V, Executive
Department, of the 1849 Constitution provided
for the popular election of a Secretary of State, a
Comptroller, a Treasurer, an Attorney General,
and Surveyor General. The New York
Constitution of 1846 (Article V, Section 1), which
probably served as a model for the 1849
framers, carried a similar provision for all of the
above officers except the Surveyor General.
During Committee of the Whole and
Convention second reading consideration of the
Executive article, debate focused on the
necessity of a popularly elected Comptroller.
The House did not question or debate the office
of Treasurer.
An 1862 legislative amendment changed the
word "Comptroller" to "Controller," and
provided for the election of all the named
officers at the same time, place, and manner as
the Governor and Lieutenant Governor. Their
terms of office would be the same as that of the
Governor (Statutes, 1862, Chapter 317, pp.
434-35, 582). The 1879 framers retained the 1849
section as amended in 1862, making only a
o-rammatical correction and relocating it to
Section Seventeen of the Executive Article V.
The House adopted the section without debate
durino-0 Committee of the Whole consideration of
the article, and during the Convention first and
second readings.
Between 1879 and 1966, the only constitutional
amendments having any effect on the ofice of
the Treasurer were those ratified in 1946, 1948,
and 1958 (see above item one), which provided
for a line of succession to the executive in case
of the incapacity of the Governor or Lieutenant
Governor. By 1946, the line of succession had
extended down to the State Treasurer. As we
have seen, as recommended by the Constitution
Revision Commission, Proposition 1A of 1966
repealed the existing line of succession and
transferred the authority to determine
succession to the Legislature.
Besides the addition of the Lieutenant Governor
to the list of popularly elected constitutional
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officers, the Constitution Revision Commission
made no substantial changes to Section
Seventeen (new Section Ten). Their 1966 draft
report commented: "In order to obtain greater
consistency in draftsmanship, the Lieutenant
Governor was added to the list of officers in
existing Section 17. Other changes are in
phraseology only." 53
Proposition 1A, ratified by the voters on
November 8, 1966, contained the revision
recommended by the Constitution Revision
Commission (except that it had been
renumbered Section Eleven): "The Lieutenant
Governor, Attorney General, Controller,
Secretary of State, and Treasurer shall be elected
at the same time and places and for the same
term as the Governor." Proposition 140, the
Political Reform Initiative of November 6, 1990,
added the final sentence to the present Section
Eleven limiting each officer to two terms. 54

Board of Equalization
The 1849 framers did not provide for a Board of
Equalization, but they did mandate that taxes be
equal and uniform throughout the state; that
property be taxed according to its value; and
that assessors be elected in the district or county
in which the property is situated (Article XI,
Miscellaneous Provisions, Section Thirteen).
The provision, which was not part of the
original draft report of the article, was first
introduced by Henry W. Halleck of Monterey on
behalf "of the southern members," during
Committee of the Whole consideration of Article
XL The section, probably drafted by Pablo de la
Guerra of Santa Barbara, was similar to a
provision in the Constitution of Alabama
(Browne, Debates pp. 256, 364-65, 371).
Debate over the section was lengthy, and had
the effect of splitting the delegation
geographically into north versus south. Because
there was no "capitation tax," state tax revenue
would necessarily come from property, or, more
precisely, land. The larger land holders,
therefore, would shoulder most of the tax
burden. Shouldn't those persons who were

earning money in the mines and who were the
larger population be taxed, even though they
did not necessarily own land?
Concentrated principally in the southern part of
the state, the Californio, ranchers had only a
vague understanding of the Anglo-American
valuation of land for taxation. For the
Californios the value of their lands had been
based on the cattle the land produced, rather
than its potential as sub-divided real estate.
Spanish and Mexican law prohibited the
subdivision and sale of a land grant. It was
important for the Californios to have locally
elected assessors who understood their
valuation. The Mexican delegates perhaps knew
that the only way they could realize the
Anglo-based assessed value of their land was to
sell it. After considerable debate, the House
concurred with the section, as adopted in
Committee of the Whole and amended during
the convention second reading (As adopted,
Section 13 copied in part Section 27 of Art. XI of
Texas's 1845 Constitution, provision for locally
elected assessors added. Brown, Debates, pp.
364-76).
To facilitate the mandate for equal and uniform
taxation the Legislature established the Board of
Equalization in 1870 (Statutes, 1869-1870,
Chapter 489, p. 714). The Board consisted of the
Controller and two Governor-appointed
members, serving at his pleasure, for a term of
four years. After codification in 1872, provision
for the Board of Equalization, its members and
their salaries, could be found in Political Code
Section 3696.
In an ironic interpretation of the intent of the
1849 framers, the California Supreme Court in
1874 found that Section 3696 of the Political
Code was unconstitutional (Houghton v. Austin,
47 Cal. 646) .. The court removed the Board of
Equalization's power to change property
valuations of county assessors because Section
Thirteen of Article XI of the constitution had
mandated that assessors had to be elected in the
district or county in which the property was
located. An 1876 amendment to the Political
Code provided for a State Board of Equalization
which consisted of the Governor, Controller, and
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Attorney General. The Legislature repealed the
old provision for salaries (Statutes, 1875-1876,
Chapter 577, p. 11).
By making a constitutional provision for the
Board of Equalization, the 1879 framers assured
its continued existence and returned the
authority that the California Supreme Court had
stripped from it in 1874. The new Board
consisted of the Controller and one member
elected from each congressional district of the
state, to serve four-year terms (Article XIIt
Revenue and Taxation, Sections Nine and Ten).
The 1879 debate regarding the Board of
Equalization indicates that the convention did
not question the necessity of the existence of the
Board, or that the members should be elected.
Debate focused on the number of Board
members, and the power of the Board to change
individual assessments. The statements of many
delegates show a strong central motivation for
interest in the Board of Equalization. Unlike the
1849 Californios struggling to maintain a
doomed livelihood, the 1879 reformers seemed
determined to revitalize and strengthen the
Board in preparation for corning battle.
Powerful interests, such as the Southern Pacific
Railroad and Miller and Lux, had already used
the courts to render the Board impotent. The
Board of Equalization had become another
weapon of reform. 55
On November 4, 1884, voters ratified a
constitutional amendment authorizing the
Legislature to redistrict the state into four
equalization districts, and to provide for the
elections of Board of Equalization members
from those districts rather than congressional
districts. On November 8, 1910, voters ratified
an amendment which deleted all but the first
sentence of Section Ten of Article XIIt which
maintained the 1849 provision for local
assessment of property. The amendment also
created a new Section Fourteen that greatly
expanded the provisions taken from Section Ten
regarding assessments of railroads. The new
section, consisting of almost 2,000 words,
delineated in great detail tax assessment for
public utilities, personal property, and insurance
companies in California.
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Records of the Constitution Revision
Commission indicate that as early as 1964, the
Joint Committee on Legislative Organization,
which administered the Commission, was
scrutinizing the lengthy and ponderous Article
XIII on Revenue and Taxation.
Recommendations of the Commission made no
substantive changes in the provision for an
elected State Board of Equalization, however. By
November 5, 1974, the Legislature had placed
the work of the Revision Commission on the
ballot. Proposition 8 (ACA 32) applied solely to
Article XIII, deleting 8,200 words, and
transferring many provisions to the statutes
books. Sections Nine and Ten of the 1879 Article
XIII essentially became new Sections Seventeen,
Eighteen, and Nineteen of Article XIII of the
present constitution. Proposition 140, "The
Political Reform Act of 1980/' limited to two the
terms of any Board of Equalization member.

State Personnel Board
There were no provisions for a civil service
system in either the 1849 or 1879 constitutions.
The system, which became constitutional in
1934, had a statutory history prior to that time.
The Legislature established a civil service
system for California in 1913 (Statutes, 1913,
Chapter 590, p. 1035). The State Civil Service
Commission, a three-member body appointed
by the Governor for four-year terms, was
created to administer the system. The statute
provided for the salaries of the commissioners,
and included a proviso that a commissioner
could be removed only by an Assembly and
Senate concurrent resolution adopted by a
two-thirds vote of each house.
In 1921, the Legislature reorganized the State
Civil Service Commission (Statutes, 1921,
Chapter 601, p. 1020). One member would be
designated as the executive, ex officio president
and principal administrator. The statute outlined
the duties of the two remaining members who
were designated as associates, and established
salaries. In 1925 the Legislature again
reorganized the Civil Service Commission,

--------------------------------~
reducing it to one member with a higher salary
(Statutes, 1925, Chapter 236, p. 391). In 1927 the
Legislature reorganized the State Civil Service
Commission still another time, changing it back
to its 1921 configuration of three members and
authorizing travelling expenses (Statutes, 1927,
Chapter 43, p. 75).

Board was "authorized to appoint an executive
officer who should be a member of the state
civil service, but not a member of the board." 57

In 1929 the Legislature established a new
Division of Personnel and Organization within
the Department of Finance to administer the
state civil service system. The statute transferred
the former powers and duties of the State Civil
Service Commission to the new Division of
Personnel and Organization. Members of the
Civil Service Commission, with the approval of
the Director of Finance, would appoint the Chief
of the new Division who was given the former
duties of the executive of the State Civil Service
Commission. The Department of Finance
retained the State Civil Service Commission as a
"quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial body." 56

The act provides a nonpartisan Personnel
Board of five members to serve ten-year
terms so staggered that each new
Governor will have but one appointment
on a five-man board upon taking office.
This four-to-one ration will be an
effective means of preventing political
interference with the efficient
administration of State business. 58

Proposition 7, the initiative constitutional
amendment that established Article XXIV
(State Civil Service) in 1934, created the State
Personnel Board as its administrative head and
abolished the Division of Personnel and
Organization. The Board consisted of five
members appointed by the Governor, with the
advice and consent of the Senate, for ten-year
terms. The first Board would consist of the
Director of Finance, the Legislative Counsel, and
the Controller, as ex officio members, plus two
Governor-appointed members. Members could
be removed only by a two-thirds vote of each
house of the Legislature, and compensation for
members would be the same as for the previous
Division of Personnel and Organization. The

Proponents of civil service reform Proposition 7
explained in the ballot arguments why members
of the Personnel Board served ten-year terms:

In their consideration of Article XXIV for
revision in 1965, the Constitution Revision
Commission determined to "continue to provide
for the Personnel Board," serving ten-year
terms. 5 9
Proposition 14 of 1970 (ACA 36), revised the
Civil Service Article XXIV as recommended by
the Constitution Revision Commission. The
sections which had originally provided for
membership and compensation and duties of
the Personnel Board, Sections 2(a), (b), (c), and
3(a), stayed substantially the same (except for
the addition of 3(b)). Proposition 14 of 1976
(ACA 40), which repealed Article XXIV and
created the present Article VIII, maintained the
1970 organization of the Personnel Board-five
appointed members serving ten-year terms
with a directive to enforce the civil service
statutes-in Sections 2(a), (b), (c), and 3(a)
and (b).
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THE LEGISLATIVE BRANCH
Legislative Structure
The framers of both the 1849 and 1879
Constitutions provided for a two-house
Legislature, consisting of a Senate and Assembly
(Article IV, Legislative Department, Section
One). Both conventions adopted the provisions
without debate. The question of a unicameral
legislature was not entertained. The federal
government had instituted a bicameral
legislature, and it was the adopted practice of
the states. It is not surprising, therefore, that the
convention proceedings do not contain historical
debate on the subject.
As a champion of the newly constructed, and as
yet unratified, Constitution of the United States,
James Madison eloquently argued that
bicameralism would help bring "order and
stability" to the new government (The
Federalist, No. 62). He advocated a "second/'
"distinct" legislative branch as a check on the
first branch. As unfortunately occurs in
republican governments, Madison argued,
elected representatives
may forget their obligations to their
constituents and prove unfaithful to their
important trust. In this point of view a
senate, as a second branch of the
legislative assembly distinct from and
dividing power with the first, must be in
all cases a salutary check on the
government. It doubles the security to
the people by requiring the concurrence
of two distinct bodies in schemes of
usurpation or perfidity, where the
ambition or corruption of one would
otherwise be sufficient. 60
The Articles of Confederation (1778) had
provided for a single-house Congress of
"annually appointed" representatives from the
various states who served no more "than three
years in any term of six years." Madison's
treatise, as much an indictment of the Articles as

a defense of the new Constitution, offered the
upper house of senators serving six-year terms
as a check on the "important errors" of
short-term, unmotivated legislatures.
[N]o small share of the present
embarrassments of America is to be
charged on the blunders of our
governments . . . . What indeed are all
the repealing, explaining, and amending
laws, which fill and disgrace our
voluminous codes, but so many
monuments of deficient wisdom; so
many impeachments exhibited by each
succeeding against each preceding
session. 61
Every state election changed one-half of the
congressional representatives. The "rapid
succession of new members," no matter how
qualified they were, led to capricious "public
councils." A Senate would provide "some stable
institution in the government." Inconstant
nations, like inconstant people, fall victim to
their own "unsteadiness and folly." America,
Madison lamented, "is held in no respect by her
friends ... is the derision of her enemies;
and . . . is a prey to every nation which has an
interest in speculating on her fluctuating
councils and embarrassed affairs." 62
"Mutable policy" had proven even more
disastrous internally. The "sagacious, the
enterprising, and the moneyed few" gained
unfair advantage "over the industrious and
uniformed" masses by following and investing
in fluctuating commerce and revenue laws.
Inconstancy and instability "poisons the
blessings of liberty itself."
It will be of little avail to the people that
the laws are made by men of their own
choice if the laws be so voluminous that
they cannot be read, or so incoherent
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that they cannot be understood; if they
be repealed or revised before they are
promulgated, or undergo such incessant
changes that no man, who knows what
the law is today, can guess what it will
be tomorrow. Law is defined to be a rule
of action; but how can that be a rule,
which is little known, and less fixed? 63

legislature." In 1913 and 1915, legislators
proposed unicameral constitutional
amendments in both the Senate and Assembly. ,
If they got as far as a vote, however, the bills
failed
to get the necessary two-thirds majority
(1913-SCA 73, ACA 91; 1915-SCA 16,
ACA 38). 66

"No government," Madison concluded, "any
more than an individual, will long be respected
without being truly respectable; nor be truly
respectable without possessing a certain portion
of order and stability." The document that
Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John
Jay had so diligently defended proved
successful. An indisputable masterpiece of
organic law, the Constitution of the United
States commanded the respect of many nations.
It's provisions for such institutions as
bicameralism helped bring order and stability to
America. 64

The 1920 census clearly revealed the results of
urbanization-the majority of Americans lived
in cities. In California, seventy percent of the
population lived in the San Francisco Bay area
counties and in the cities of Los Angeles County
and adjacent southern counties. In 1910,
thirty-four percent of California's population
lived in the Bay Area counties, thirty-two
percent lived in the southern counties. By 1920,
the shift that would define California's future
urban concentration had begun. Los Angeles
and the south, with a population of 1,346,600,
had overtaken San Francisco and the north's
population of 1,069,541 (thirty-nine percent and
thirty-one percent respectively of the total state
population of 3,426,861). 67

Warning the delegation against "legislative
enactments" in the organic law, and reminding
them that the people had charged them with
preparing "a system by which they can enact
laws for themselves," delegate Charles T. Botts
said at the 1849 convention: "No civilized
people pretend to pass laws without at least
making them run the gauntlet of two Houses,
differently constituted." By 1849, when the
framers of California's first constitution set
about their work, Madison's doctrine of
bicameralism had become as inviolable as the
federal constitution itself. 65
As we have seen, after the turn of the century,
the issue of reapportionment had prevented
constitutional revision by convention in
California. The reapportionment problem also
opened the discussion for unicameral
legislatures. According to David W. Brady and
Brian J. Gaines 'there have been a dozen serious
efforts to bring unicameralism to California."
Differing "in myriad respects," each successive
proposal has "had less to do with
unicameralism than some other proposed
change." As early as 1913, regional tensions
brought on by the reapportionment issue had
"manifested in various plans to re-organize the
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After 1920, apportionment standoffs in the
California legislature occurred at two levels:
urban versus rural, and north versus south. For
the next forty-four years, until the federal and
state supreme courts decided the issue for the
legislature, the apportionment battle and
accompanying plans for legislative
reorganization continued. Unicameral legislative
constitutional amendment~, if they did reach a
vote and many did not, never won the
necessary two-thirds majority (SCA 18, 1921;
SCA 34, 1923; SCA 12, 1925; SCA 6, ACA 69,
1935; SCA 21, ACA 28, ACA 33, 1937; ACA 24,
1939; ACA 17, 1941). 68
In 1934, when California voters approved a call
for a constitutional convention (the one that the
legislature never enacted), several states were
appraising unicameralism. By 1936 unicameral
bills had been considered in twelve states. The
following year twenty-one states considered
over forty such proposals. Nebraska had
adopted a non-partisan, single-house legislature
in 1934, but was the only state to ever actually
enact that reform. 69
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Brady and Gaines have noted that after 1964,
unicameralism continued to resurface as a
popular reform into the early 1970s. Issues that
had always underscored the debate became the
defining issues after reapportionment settled.
Before 1964,
Proponents looked to unicameralism to
improve: (1) efficiency; (2) economy, and
(3) responsibility. Moreover, the claim
was often made that the legacy of Hiram
Johnson's Progressive governorship was
an increase in "executive control and
leadership" that left the two-house
legislature "unwieldy and cumbersome."
Economy became a "relatively minor issue"
after 1964. "The central issues, instead, were
efficiency and effectiveness, particularly in
executive-legislative relations." 70
In the March 1965 staff report of the
Constitution Revision Commission to the
Executive Committee of that body,
recommended revisions to Section One, Article
IV included only simplification of language and
deletion of statutory material. Bicameralism was
not addressed.
The language of existing Section 1 which
vests legislative power in the Legislature
and reserves initiative and referendum
powers to the people has been
simplified. The provision requiring every
statute to have an enacting clause as
specified has been deleted; it is to be
placed in the Government Code because
it does not involve a basic constitutional
right.
Following a "more rational organization of
Article IV" the Commission recommended
removal of the lengthy material added to section
one in 1911 (Initiative and Referendum) to the
end of the article. 71
The revision ratified by the voters in 1966
(Proposition 1A) is today' s simplified Section
One:
The legislative power of this State is
vested in the California Legislature

which consists of the Senate and
Assembly, but the people reserve to
themselves the powers of initiative and
referendum:
The lengthy initiative and referendum materials
were removed to the end of Article IV sections
twenty-two through twenty-six. 72

Shorten Legislative Sessions
The 1849 constitutional framers provided for
annual sessions of the legislature, commencing
on the first Monday of January, but did not
stipulate how long each session should run
(Article IV, Legislative Department, Section
Two)'. The section as reported by the Committee
on the Constitution copied Iowa's 1844
constitution in wording and structure, except
that the space for "annual" or "biennial" was
left blank to be determined by the convention.
Iowa's constitution of 1844 provided for biennial
legislative sessions (Article IV, Section Two).
During Committee of the Whole consideration
of the section debate centered on the question of
annual or biennial sessions. Delegates William
M. Gwin, Oliver M. Wozencraft, Morton M.
McCarver, Jacob R. Snyder, and Elam Brown
argued for biennial sessions. Gwin and
Wozencraft asserted that annual sessions would
be expensive and lead to excessive legislation.
Gwin noted that all the new states had biennial
sessions-Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi,
Arkansas, Tennessee, Illinois, Missouri, Iowa,
Wisconsin, and Michigan. In Iowa a legislator
got two dollars a day for a maximum of fifty
days, and one dollar a day after that. The
expense would be much greater in inflationary
California. McCarver asked how the revenue
would be raised to defray the expense of an
annual legislature? A land tax would be
"oppressive" to the limited land owners, and a
capitation tax "revolting." Brown feared
speedily enacted and repealed laws. Laws need
time to be tested. Additionally, no matter how
wealthy California was, the worst policy a new
state could adopt was "to establish an expensive
system of government." 73
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Delegates Robert Semple, Myron Norton, Henry
W. Halleck, Charles T. Botts, Edward Gilbert,
and Winfield S. Sherwood favored annual
sessions. Semple argued that biennial sessions
would not allow enough time to enact an entire
code of laws for California. It would be
"impossible" to keep legislators at the capital
for more than two or three months a year. "The
rapid progress of affairs in this country, and the
great value of time, would render a longer
session impracticable." Norton exclaimed "We
have no laws here." Regarding the expense,
"What of that?" California had proportionate
means. "We have great wealth here." 74
Halleck asserted that "If there is a country in the
world, at the present time, that requires the
Legislature to meet at least once a year, it is
California." The Legislature had to enact new
laws to provide for the "peculiar circumstances"
of California. In addition, there was an
"immense emigration directing its course into
California." If necessary limit the length of each
session "to a certain number of days or
months," but keep the sessions annual. 75
Botts feared that biennial sessions would leave
too much power to the Governor in the interim.
The people of California "will not be content
that any one man power should govern them in
retracting or improving the laws which they
may make." Regarding the expense, everything
was expensive in California. The people were,
however, "the most wealthy in the world."
Gilbert reminded Gwin that all of the biennial
states that he named had seven to thirty years
experience as territories, allowing time to
establish and work out their first laws.
"Nothing but annual sessions would answer the
demands of the community" for the repeal and
replacement of the "repugnant" system now in
place?6
The convention, in Committee of the Whole,
adopted annual sessions. Gwin tried to amend
the section during the convention second
reading with "until otherwise provided by law."
The proviso allowed the legislature or the
people the opportunity to change to biennial
sessions after a few years without having to
amend the constitution. After the same debate
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as occurred in Committee of the Whole the
delegation rejected Gwin's amendment by a
vote of eight to twenty-five. By 1862 Section
Two had been amended to change to biennial
sessions commencing on the first Monday in
December rather than January. The amendment
(Chapter 317, Statutes, 1862) also limited
legislative sessions to 120 days. 77
The 1879 framers adopted biennial legislative
meetings, but changed the commencement back
to the first Monday in January. With the
exception of the session following ratification of
the constitution which could run 100 days,
regular sessions of the legislature could not
exceed sixty days without a loss in pay. The
delegation added a final clause to the new
Article IV Section Two prohibiting the
introduction of any bill after fifty days from the
commencement of any regular session without a
two-thirds vote of the members. (The first
session was allowed ninety days).
During the 1878-79 debates a general mood of
distrust and loss of faith with the legislature
prevailed. The Workingmen delegates had run
on the platform: "There shall be no special
legislation by the state legislature, and no state
legislature should meet oftener than once in
every four years." Workingmen delegates
William F. White, and Charles C. O'Donnell, and
Non-Partisans George A. Johnson, and Edward
Martin spoke in favor of "quadrennial" sessions.
Calling the legislature a "most expensive body,"
White said that his constituents "have felt the
greatest anxiety to have them adjourn."
Legislators were becoming professional, "going
into politics as a business." If the legislature met
only once in four years, the "office hunters"
would "be obliged to go at some honest
employment." 78
Johnson and Martin spoke in the interests of
economy and popular sentiment. Although
quadrennial sessions were a "novelty," Johnson
believed "a better class of men" would be
elected, "and the interests of the people of this
State will be looked after better than they are at
present." Martin said that his constituents
favored the legislature meeting once in four
years. "In fact," he added, "they do not care if it
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never meets. They can get along without it."
Noting that there wasn't a "State in the Union,"
or "a civilized government in creation" where
the legislature met only once in four years, the
convention rejected the quadrennial proposal?9
Section Two, as originally reported by the
Committee on the Legislative Department,
prohibited any regular session from exceeding
sixty days, except the first session called after
the adoption of the constitution which could
meet for eighty days. Non-Partisans George V.
Smith, Walter Van Dyke, and Jonathan V.
Webster, and Workingmen delegate Henry
Larkin, preferred that the constitution limit the
pay of legislators rather than the length of
sessions. Smith believed that limiting pay to
sixty days would keep regular sessions short.
More important than economy, short sessions
were desirable because "the longer the
Legislature that is not doing good work is in
session the more chance there is for evil."
Additionally, "[t]he policy has been in most of
the states to reduce the time of service." 80
Van Dyke argued that if you limit the time of
the session the legislature "would be driven in
the last few days to consider the most important
legislation," resulting in "hasty and ill
considered" laws. By limiting compensation
"you accomplish the whole purpose, and then
let the terms be continued until the work is
completed ... properly and in order." If the
legislature was facing a "matter of great
importance," Webster concluded, "they should
not be cut-off from enactment of good laws by a
constitutional provision." But, if you cut their
pay after a specified time, the legislature was
"not likely to stay longer than is absolutely
necessary to enact the legislation which is
before them." 81
David S. Terry and Joseph A. Filcher,
Non-Partisan members of the Committee on the
Legislative Department, defended the section
they had drafted. Filcher stated that the popular
reforms demanded were already in the section
as reported. "The evil of special legislation is
aimed at. The lobby influence is aimed at." No
delegate had proposed any improvement. He
asked the convention to quit "trifling" with the

section and "get on to other and more important
business." Workingmen delegate Charles
Beerstecher sarcastically proposed an
amendment: "There shall be no Legislature
convened from and after the adoption of this
Constitution, in this State, and any person who
shall be guilty of suggesting that a Legislature
be held, shall be punished as a felon without the
benefit of clergy." The section as amended
limited the pay rather than the time of regular
sessions to sixty days, and increased the (pay)
limit of the first session from eighty to 100
days. 82
During the 1878-79 debate, the belief that
limiting the legislature would shift excessive
power to the executive resurfaced. Echoing 1849
delegate Charles T. Botts' sentiment that an
unassembled legislature leaves only the
governor, Workingmen delegate Peter J. Joyce
mistrusted his party's call for quadrennial
sessions. Corrupt corporations advocate
abolition of legislatures and "go in for putting
power in the hands of the Governors." The
legislature had passed corrupt bills, but, he
wanted to know, "how many of these corrupt
bills have ever been vetoed by the Governors of
this State?" Larkin, who preferred annual over
quadrennial sessions, said "[t]he policy of a
republican government" was to "bring the
representatives a little nearer to the people." He
believed in "bringing the Government as near to
the people as possible." He did not believe in
"leaving it to the Governor." 83
Filcher stated that his "most vital objection" to
the proposals of the convention regarding
legislative sessions was "the idea of so long
absenting the people from those who have
power over them." The convention could not
afford to endorse such a policy.
The idea that the administration and the
Legislature could come in here
simultaneously and go out together is
not a good one. The administration
would be absolutely left to itself during
its term. Assuming that the Governor
should become implicated in some
nefarious practices, I ask you what
power there is under such a system to
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reach him? You provide that the
Governor may be impeached, but as
soon as the sixty days of the Legislature
are over he is left to himself. One of the
best features of our government is that
the officers are frequently brought face to
face with those whom the people elect to
scrutinize their action. The oftener you
can send up persons directly from the
people, and in this capacity legislators
come, to look into and examine the
affairs of the State, and confront the
officers enlisted with power by the
people, the better your government. 84
At the special election of October 10, 1911 which
provided for initiative and referendum, voters
ratified a constitutional amendment to Section
Two which provided for bifurcated biennial
legislative sessions. Each session, beginning in
January as provided in 1879, commenced in
odd-numbered years and continued for thirty
calendar days only. After a mandatory
"constitutional recess" of not less than thirty
calendar days, both houses of the legislature
reassembled for the second part of the session.
The first part of the session was for the
introduction of bills, and only urgency measures
were passed. After the recess the legislature
considered the bills presented in January. No
new bills could be introduced without a
two-thirds vote of both houses. The
constitutional recess was instituted in order to
provide time for the public to read and analyze
measures that had been introduced durincrb the
first thirty days. 85
Between 1947 and 1966 the legislature met in
annual general and budget sessions. A
November 5, 1946 constitutional amendment to
Article IV, Section Two switched the legislature
back to annual sessions. General sessions
commenced in the odd-numbered years, and
budget sessions commenced in the
even-numbered years. General sessions
remained bifurcated with a thirty-day bill
introduction period, a thirty-day recess,
followed by an unspecified period to consider
the bills introduced in January. Budget sessions
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convened on the first Monday in March in the
even-numbered years. 86
A 1949 constitutional amendment limited the
second half of the general session to 120
calendar days, exclusive of the recess. The
amendment also restricted the budget session to
thirty calendar days, consideration of the
following fiscal year's Budget Bill and its
appropriate revenue acts, approval or rejection
of city and county charters and charter
amendments, and acts necessary for session
expenses. 87
A November 6, 1956 constitutional amendment
added subdivision (c) to Section Two or Article
IV which changed the meeting date of the
budget session to the first Monday in February.
After the Budget Bill was introduced during a
budget session, both houses could take a
thirty-day recess, and then reconvene for a
session not to exceed thirty days. Between 1958
and 1966, the legislature was able to pass the
Budget Bill without reconvening in
extraordinary sessions only once in 1960.88
On November 4, 1958 voters ratified Proposition
9 (ACA 36), which abolished the constitutional
recess and limited general sessions to 120
calendar days, not includincr
b Saturdavs and
Sundays (in effect allowing 166 total days).
Proposition 9 also prohibited any bill, other than
the Budget Bill, to be heard by committee or
acted upon until thirty calendar days after its
introduction, a three-fourths vote of the house
necessary to override the provision. The
thirty-day, bifurcated session initiated in 1911
intended that the public have an opportunity to
review bills before they were acted upon. Since
that time, however, the number of bills
introduced increased, leaving the state printer
no time to publish them all for public use.
Increasing the session to 120 days allowed the
introduction of bills to be spread out, and the
printer more time to publish. 89
J

The March 1965 Staff Report of the Constitution
Revision Commission to the Executive
Committee indicates that the Committee wanted
to institute two-year legislative sessions, but
recommended annual sessions instead.
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Although lengthy, that portion of the report is
reproduced here because it illustrates intent and
explains why the Committee changed its course.
As a result of the State's growth its
problems have become so numerous and
substantial that they should not await
the reconvening of the Legislature every
two years in a session open to general
legislation, or the discretion of the
Governor. With each biennium the
special or extraordinary" session which
has met concurrently with the budget
session in the even numbered year, the
list of items which the Governor
authorizes the Legislature to consider
has lengthened. Special sessions with
purported "limited" agendas virtually
have become general" sessions, and the
revision recognizes that fact.
II

11

Based on the procedure in the U. S.
Congress, the Alaska, Massachusetts and
Michigan Legislatures, among others,
there was some sentiment for annuat
regular sessions of unlimited duration.
Jockeying for favorable position and the
ever-present log jams of legislation
toward the end of each session would be
avoided. However, legislator-members of
the Commission favored a limitation on
session length. They pointed out that
based on their experience unlimited
sessions would be politically unsaleable
because they would require even greater
compensation for legislators than the
members of the public would approve
and would require elimination of the
long-standing California tradition of the
''citizen-legislator."
The Legislature would be established as
a continuous body for a two-year period
in the same manner as the United States
Congress. This will permit legislation yet
unconsidered at the end of the first
annual session to carry-over until the
next regular session. Similar procedure is
followed in the U. S. Congress and in the
Michigan Legislature, among others.

Printing costs and time would be
saved . . . .
However, the existing provision was
retained following a conference with the
Governor and the members of the
Executive Committee. It is anticipated
that annual sessions without restriction
as to subject matter of legislation will
diminish the need for special
extraordinary sessions except in genuine
emergency situations. 90
The final recommendation of the Staff Report
parallels the provision of the constitutional
amendment placed before the voters the
following year:
[The new section] replaces subdivisions
(a) and (c) of existing Section 2 and
provides for the convening annually of a
session of the Legislature limited to 120
calendar days (exclusive of Saturdays
and Sundays). At present such a session
meets only once every two years in the
odd-numbered year. The present
distinction between regular ("general")
and regular ("budget") sessions has been
eliminated because the latter which
occurred once a biennium in the even
numbered year, has been abolished.
There will be only one type of regular
session; it will be annual and general
legislation may be considered. 91
Proposition 1A of November 8, 1966 (ACA 13)
repealed Section Two of Article IV and
substituted it with new Section Three. Although
the 1965 Revision Commission might have
recommended the two-year sessions that we
have today, in the end, Proposition 1A did not
go that far.
Sec. 3. (a) The Legislature shall meet
annually in regular session at noon on
the Monday after January 1. A measure
introduced at any session may not be
deemed pending before the Legislature
at any other session.
The provision abolished the budget session, and
eliminated the 120-day time limit. Convening on
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the first Monday after January 1, the sessions
were of unlimited duration in which any type of
bill could be introduced. After all bills had been
decided on, the legislature recessed for thirty
days, and then reconvened to consider vetoed
bills. 92
Proposition 4 (ACA 95) "reorganized" the
Legislature into two-year sessions. Ratified by
the voters on November 7, 1972, it enacted the
changes originally wanted by the Constitution.
Revision Commission seven years earlier.
Proposition 4 amended Section 3 (a) of Article
IV to its present construction. In their
supporting argument for the amendment,
Assembly Speaker Bob Moretti, Assembly
Republican Leader Bob Monagan, and Senate
Republican Leader Fred Marler advised voters
that the proposal would "streamline" legislative
operations. "It will result in reforms in
operations, greater efficiency, more
responsiveness to the public and some modest
recurring savings estimated at several hundred
thousand dollars." 93

Time Bills Must be in Print
The earliest constitutional reference to the
printing of bills can be found in Article IV,
Section Fifteen of the 1879 Constitution. Section
Fifteen, as originally reported by the Committee
on the Legislative Department, provided that all
bills must be "read at length" on final passage,
but the section did not provide for three
readings or printing of bills.
During Committee of the Whole consideration
of the section, Workingmen delegates John D.
Condon and James S. Reynolds proposed
amendments to Section Fifteen which would
mandate that bills be read "on three several
days in each house," and that they be printed
with amendments before passage. After
encountering opposition from members of the
Committee who drafted the section, Reynolds
defended the amendments. Every man's
experience at the convention showed him the
necessity of printing bills. "It is impossible for a
member to understand what he is voting for, or
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what the provisions of a bill are, by hearing
them read at the desk." The object of
considering a bill "on three several days, before
being put upon its final passage" was "to
prevent hasty legislation." The amendments
were not intended to "hamper" legislation, "but
to compel it to be done decently and in order,
after the legislation has been considered."
Reynolds later added further support to his
argument by showing that at least twenty-one
states had put similar provisions in their
constitutions. 94
In defense of the amendments Charles
Beerstecher noted that hasty legislation had
been "the curse of this State, and the curse of
several States in this Union." He could not
understand the objections to the provision. "A
bill is introduced and kept in the hands of the
Clerk, and he reads it, and it is put upon its
passage, and no one sees the bill until it is
enrolled." Often, "an entirely different bill is
enrolled than the one passed." The section, as
amended, was "a guard put on the Legislature."
The delegation adopted Section Fifteen, as
amended, in Committee of the Whole and in the
convention first and second readings. 95
As we have seen, the thirty-day stipulation first
appeared in Section Two of Article IV with the
adoption of the Progressive amendments at the
October 10, 1911 special election. The
"constitutional recess" of the bifurcated
legislative sessions was intended to "give the
public time to read and analyze measures
introduced during the first thirty days." Section
Fifteen had already provided that bills be
printed after introduction. People had thirty
days to procure a copy of the printed bill and
contact their legislator regarding its
provisions. 96
On November 4, 1958 voters ratified Proposition
9 (ACA 36) which amended Article IV, Section
Two. As discussed above, this amendment
abolished the split legislative session and the
"constitutional recess," and extended general
sessions to 120 calendar days, not including
Saturdays and Sundays. Proposition 9 also
mandated that no bill, other than the Budget
Bill, could be heard by any committee or acted
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on in either house for thirty calendar days
following introduction.
Writing in favor of the proposition, Assembly
members Allen Miller, and Charles Conrad, and
Senator John F. McCarthy argued that, although
the 1911 amendment was well intentioned it had
ceased to be functional.
[T]he tremendous increase in legislative
problems resulting from the rapid
growth and development of our State
has caused such a flood of bills that the
State Printer is unable to get them into
print until the end of the recess and the
public has little time to study them.
Further, the split session has led to the
mass introduction of bills before the
recess, which results in little chance to
work out details of any proposal. This
means that many bills are in skeletal or
"spot bill" form and convey only that
the author has in mind some
unidentified change in the law on a
particular subject. Such bills mean little
to the public, and must be later amended
and reprinted-all of which is
time-consuming and expensive. 97
The amendment allowed ninety days for the
introduction of bills, giving legislators time to
properly prepare bills before printing. Saturdays
and Sundays could be used to confer with
constituents and answer public inquiries.
Proponents promised voters that the Legislative
Counsel would maintain a "digest" of every
measure introduced. With the extended bill
introduction period, the Legislative Counsel
could keep the index and digest current during
the whole session. "This would allow you [the
voter] to examine the index and digest at any
time to determine whether legislation you are
interested in has been introduced." People
would have thirty days after introduction to
determine the effect of a bill. 98
Although the Constitution Revision
Commission initially wanted to eliminate the
thirty-day waiting period in their
recommendation to the legislature, they
subsequently changed their opinion. The Article

IV "Staff Report" of 1965 described the process
which led to their final recommendation.
[T]he 30-day waiting period for action on
bills after their introduction at regular
sessions of the Legislature has been
retained . . . . Initial drafts of Article IV
eliminated this restriction because the
waiting period was regarded as
ineffective against the alleged evil it
sought to prevent: lack of notice of the
content of pending legislation. The
Legislature could waive the 30-day delay
by a three-fourths vote, and it did not
prevent the use of the "skeleton" bill or
"author's amendments" which could
alter the entire bill without subjecting it
to further delay. No other state
constitution contains a similar restriction
on the progress of a bill.
However, the provision was restored on
the advice of legislator-members of the
Commission. They pointed out that in
1958 the 30-day bill waiting period was
substituted for the former 30-day recess
which occurred after the first month of
general session in odd-numbered years.
That recess was used for the printing of
the bills introduced in the first four
weeks of the session; it also allowed
various groups to review pending
legislation. Eliminating the 30-day period
would remove a protection that was
intended to be retained when the
bifurcated session itself was abolished.
Additionally a proposal to shorten the
30-day period to 20 days insofar as
committee action on legislation was
concerned was rejected in 1962. The
League of California Cities and others
indicated they still needed the full 30
days to review legislation and to notify a
widely scattered membership of the
pendency of measures in which they are
interested. 99
As recommended by the Constitution Revision
Commission, Proposition 1A (ACA 13) of
November 8, 1966 repealed Section Two of
Article IV and transferred that portion of
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subdivision (a) (containing the thirty-day
stipulation) to Section Eight, subdivision (a).
The language went largely unchanged, except
for modernizing phraseology. The 1879 Section
Fifteen providing for three separate readings
and printing of bills substantially became new
Section Eight, subdivision (b). Subdivisions (a)
and (b) of Section Eight have not been amended
since that time.

Retirement System
The current constitutional provision which
restricts legislative retirement entitlements
(Article IV, Section 4.5) is less than five years old
(November 6, 1990). Enactments governing
legislative retirement have been largely
statutory, and they have originated relatively
recently (approximately 1947). Discussion
concerning the issue of legislative retirement
has developed only in the recent past. But, if the
issue is approached from the question should
legislative service be considered a career
occupation?, debate can be traced to the 1849
constitution.
There are no specific references to legislative
retirement in the 1849 or 1879 constitutions. The
1849 framers provided for per diem and
travelling expenses of legislators and
constitutional officers only temporarily, until the
first legislature could establish salaries by
statute (Article XIIt Schedule, Section Fifteen).
When the Committee on the Constitution
reported the section, they left the dollar figures
blank so that the convention could determine
the amounts in Committee of the Whole. Many
delegates supported a fairly high figure. The
duties of government officers were "onerous,"
and "high salaries would command the
requisite talent." The cost of living in the
inflationary environment of gold rush California
was astronomical. The people would sanction
high salaries. 100
Delegate William M. Gwin argued that if they
did not establish low salaries the expenses of
government would be enormous and oppressive
to the tax payers. He said, "I have never known
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an office of honor in the United States where the
incumbent makes anything out of it, or even
sustains himself upon the salary." Charles T.
Botts, who inferred that Gwin was
electioneering with a popular issue (low
salaries), responded: "there are honorable places
which are kept for the rich of the land, and ... a
poor man cannot afford to accept them." A low
salary "requires a man of other means to accept
an office which will not of itself sustain him."
The Governor of the state "could not sustain
himself on $6,000 a year," but if he was "worth
millions" he could "hold the highest office of
state in the gift of the people." 101
In all new governments, Gwin retorted,
expenditures usually surpass revenues. He did
not wish to reserve public office to rich men, but
immoderate salaries led to expensive
government and "burdensome taxes on the
people." The provisions were only temporary,
and many "competent men" were "ready and
able" to occupy the offices already. If the
salaries were too low the legislature could
increase them later. "I do not desire to fix the
salaries below what is proper," Gwin concluded,
"nor do I wish to make a political hobby in
connection with this matter." 102
For legislators, the convention settled on the
same pay they had fixed for
themselves-sixteen dollars per diem, and
sixteen dollars for every twenty miles travelled.
Compared to Iowa's two dollars per diem and
two dollars per twenty miles, and New York's
three dollars per diem and one dollar per ten
miles, California's allowance seems extravagant.
When fixing their own compensation, however,
the delegates settled on a moderate sixteen
dollars, the average daily earnings of a
"mechanic" in the inflated California
economy. 103
In 1849 public office was not considered to be
an occupation. Serving as an elected official was
an honor. Political office brought status and
influence to a man, but it also carried great
responsibility, and frequently, a strain on
personal resources. It was an honor and a duty
to serve, but the service was not a primary
means of support. The sentiment of the age is
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probably best reflected in delegate Robert
Semple's observation regarding annual
legislative sessions. It would be "impossible to
keep members of the Legislature more than two
or three months at the seat of Government."
Legislators would have their private
occupations to tend to. "The rapid progress of
affairs in this country, and the great value of
time would render a longer session
impracticable." 104
The 1879 debate indicates that political office
was still not considered to be occupational. Per
diem and mileage was to be left to the
legislature to decide, but was not to exceed
eight dollars per day, ten cents per mile, and
twenty-five dollars for contingent expenses per
session (Article IV, Section Twenty-Three).
Committee of the Whole debate focused on
setting the salary high enough to attract the
proper talent, and to support a respectable
lifestyle in Sacramento, away from home,
family, and business. When setting
compensation limits, delegates were less
concerned with per diem and mileage than with
recent abuses of contingent expense funds.
The debates indicate that a propensity towards
career politics had begun to develop in the
nation, but the delegates who spoke of it
attached dishonor to the trend. During
Committee of the Whole debate on sessions of
the legislature, Workingmen delegate William F.
White explained why he supported quadrennial
sessions:
I find in the old State of Pennsylvania
they are tired of these political bodies
meeting. The young men of the country
are turning into politicians as a business.
If there was but one session in four years
these ~en would die out between the
four years and be obliged to go at some
honest employment. All the young men
are looking to politics as a means of
livelihood. I would rather that one of my
sons would carry a hod for a living than
to take the best office in the gift of this
State. Therefore, I would like to see
something done to check this office
hunting. 105

Political office was an honor and a duty, a "gift"
of the people or of the state. It was not an
occupation.
Until the 1966 revision of Article N, the
constitution had provided that the Legislature
set its own compensation by statute, but the
constitution had stipulated a ceiling. Any raise
beyond that ceiling required a popularly
approved constitutional amendment. By 1924,
Section Twenty-Three of Article IV limited
legislative salaries to $100. a month
(substantially lower than 1879's eight dollar per
diem if they worked twenty days per month).
In 1949 legislative salaries were raised to
$300. a month. By 1954, subdivision (b) of
Section Two, Article IV set legislative salaries
at $500. a month. That figure held until the 1966
revision. 106
Voters had approved a constitutional
amendment which directed the Legislature to
provide a retirement plan for state employees as
early as 1930 (Article IV, Section 22a added
November 4, 1930). The following year, the
Legislature established by statute a State
Employees Retirement System for California
(Statutes, 1931, Chapter 700, p. 1442). In 1939 the
Legislature extended the scope of the State
Employees Retirement Law to include city,
county, and school district employees who
wished to participate (Statutes, 1939, Chapter
954). Developing in the statutes and outside the
strictures of the constitution, by 1947 the
Legislature had established a retirement system
for its own members (Government Code Section
9359 et. seq.).
On November 4, 1958, voters rejected
Proposition Five, a Senate Constitutional
Amendment which would have allowed the
Legislature to fix legislator's salaries at an
amount not to exceed "the average salary of
county supervisors in the five most populous
counties" (approximately $10,080. in 1958).
Supporting the amendment, State Senator James
A. Cobey argued that public officer's salaries,
subject to constant review, did not belong in the
constitution. Every change required
constitutional amendment. A majority of states,
the United States Congress, and the Model
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Constitution of the National Municipal League,
provided for legislative salaries by statute rather
than by constitutional provision. The Joint
Legislative Committee on Legislative Procedure,
California Conference on State Government,
Committee on American Legislatures of the
American Political Science Association, and the
1957 California Citizens Legislative Advisory
Commission supported the amendment. 107
The arguments of State Senator John A. Murdy,
Jr., who wrote against Proposition Five, reflected
the seriousness of the reapportionment issue in
1958. He also provided a contemporary opinion
of legislative retirement benefits. Malapportioned districts caused pay inequities. A senator
representing over five million people in Los
Angeles County had a much larger work load
than a senator representing a smaller county of
100,000 people, but both senators made the
same salary. Conversely, it was more difficult for
an Assembly Member to cover a sparsely
populated rural district than an urban area.
Additionally, the Legislature determined the
salaries of supervisors, "directly or indirectly,"
in the five biggest counties, excepting San
Francisco which was regulated by charter. 108
Higher pay, asserted Murdy, Jr., would have a
"great liberalizing impact" on the "already
generous legislative retirement system."
The present terms of the State
Retirement System permits a Legislator
to retire at 75% of his salary if he has
had fifteen years of service and has
reached sixty-three or over. This same
retirement formula would apply on any
increased salary, not only to Legislators
retiring in the future, but would be
retroactive to those who have already
retired.
Extended to public officers, provisions of the
State Retirement System appear to indicate
countenance of legislative careers. The defeat of
Proposition Five may show, however, that
popular disapproval of political occupation
prevailed, keeping legislative office less than
lucrative. Or perhaps Senator Murdy, Jr.
reflected popular sentiment when he
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commented "Whether it is possible to buy
statesmanship by offering salary inducement is
still an unsolved problem." 109
In 1966, California voters passed Proposition 1A
(ACA 13), which removed constitutional
provisions for legislative compensation and
made them statutory in 1966. The 1965 report of
the Constitution Revision Commission, which
recommended this legislative course of action,
provides an important analysis of the
post-reapportionment compensation/ retirement
issue.
Since 1954 as each of numerous attempts
to increase salaries has failed, the
California legislators have found other
means of increasing both their
perquisites (by way of perdiem and
mileage or state-leased automobiles and
a generous pension plan geared to the
cost of living index) and their efficiency
(by way of staff assistance and similar
aids) until it is now possible for:
(1) A legislator to retire after 30 years of
service and receive more in
retirement than the constitutionally
stipulated salary he received as an
incumbent; and
(2) The press to estimate-in however
misleading a manner-that a single
legislator may have the equivalent of
$25,000 in state funds for his
individual use in any odd-numbered
year (including salary, per diem,
mileage . . . or leased automobile
and credit card, district office
allotment, postage, secretarial
assistance, and telephone). (The
implication frequently conveyed is
that the legislators pocket this entire
amount . . . . For the most part the
latter items reimburse the legislator
for his out-of-pocket expenses; the
cost of living in the capital during a
session is high).
To the unthinking voter these figures are
appalling-made no less appealing by
attempts to misrepresent them. The
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present impasse on legislators'
compensation has been characterized as
follows:
"That the citizen of California should be
so stubbornly resistive to adequate pay
for a man who copes with the problems
of a three billion dollar budget and the
intricacies of the technical legislation
essential to the largest state in the nation
is equally dismaying to the legislator ...
Thus fringe benefit begets salary
stalemate and voter opposition to
legislative carte blanche begets
fringe." 110
The Commission then proposed an "open,
rational approach to legislators compensation:"
(1) A substantial increase in salary
commensurate with the legislator's
status as a member of the third and
coequal branch of government with
the executive and judiciary
recognizing that the job of legislator
is in fact virtually full-time; and
(2) A program of constitutional and
statutory restraints on legislative
self-indulgence as to perquisites
other than annual salary.
Only with the adoption of a
compensation program outlined above
will the California legislator be able to
justify to the public at election time that
he is worthy of his hire and thus open a
new era of mutual respect between the
California citizen and his Sacramento
representative that both deserves. 111
By 1965, the commission asserted, twenty-eight

states had legislative compensation rates set by
statute, without constitutional limitation. The
United States Congress had always enjoyed that
privilege. When was California to join the fold?
Echoing the sentiments and fears of the
constitution's framers, the commission
concluded:
If the Legislature is to meet annually for

approximately six months, it will be
necessary to compensate the Members
adequately to permit them to be away
from their usual occupations. While the
California voter has been conditioned to
the concept of the "citizen-legislator"
over the years, membership in the Senate
and Assembly, with each biennium, is
becoming more than a part-time
vocation. 112
Proposition 112 of June 5, 1990 (SCA 32)
repealed the 1966 legislative compensation and
retirement statute (Chapter 163) that ratification
of Proposition lA had authorized (Ch. 163,
Statutes, 1966, 1st Extraordinary Session, pp.
721-29). Five months later, initiative
constitutional amendment Proposition 140
(Term Limits) limited legislative salaries and
operating expenses, and restricted legislative
retirement benefits by constitutional provision.
In 1965 the Constitution Revision Commission
asserted that membership in the Legislature was
becoming "more than a part-time vocation."
Twenty-five years later, however, a popular
initiative amended the constitution to assert that
"service in the Legislature" was "not ...
intended as a career occupation." Section 4.5 of
Article IV today prohibits the Legislature from
accruing more pension and retirement benefits
than are already provided by statute.
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THE INITIATIVE PROCESS
The great legacy of the Progressive Reform
Movement in California, Senate Constitutional
Amendment No. 22, passed in the Senate on
February 9, 1911 by a vote of thirty-five to one,
Senator Leroy A. Wright of San Diego casting
the only dissenting vote. On February 16, the
Assembly passed the amendment with
seventy-two votes in favor and no dissenting
votes. Placed before the voters at a special
election called by Progressive Governor Hiram
Johnson on October 10, 1911, the people ratified
the Initiative, Referendum, and Recall
constitutional amendment by a vote of 168,744
to 52,093 (see endnote 15).
Since the addition of the Initiative and
Referendum to the Constitution in 1911 (Article
IV, Section One, 1 (a), (b), (c), (d)), the provision
has gone through two constitutional revisions.
Following the recommendations of the
Constitutional Revision Commission in 1965, the
legislature placed Proposition 1A (ACA 13) on
the November 8, 1966 ballot. The popularly
ratified amendment which revised the
Legislative Article IV, repealed the 1911 Section
One and subdivisions (a), (b), (c), and (d), and
relocated them to the end of Article IV,
commencing with Section Twenty-Two (a) and
continuing through Section 26 (see endnote 72).
On June 8, 1976, voters ratified Proposition 14
(ACA 40). The amendment reorganized
provisions related to voting, the initiative,
referendum, and recall, which were "scattered
throughout the Constitution," under a single
article. As a result, current Article II-titled
Voting, Initiative and Referendum, and
Recall-contains the original1911 amendment,
fairly intact, except for modernized phraseology
and simplified structure. 113

Constitutional Amendments/Ballot
The language of current subdivision (c) of
Section Eight, Article II has not substantially
changed.

1911, Article IV, Section One (paragraph two,
sentence two, sixth clause):
the Secretary of State shall submit the
said proposed law or amendment to the
Constitution to the electors at the next
succeeding general election occurring
subsequent to 130 days after the
presentation aforesaid of said petition, or
at any special election called by the
Governor in his discretion prior to such
general election.
1966, Article IV, Section Twenty-Two,
subdivision (c):
The Secretary of State shall then submit
the measure at the next general election
held at least 131 days after it qualifies or
at any special statewide election held
prior to that general election. The
Governor may call a special statewide
election for the measure.
Constitution Revision Commission Draft Report,
1965 Comments:
a new procedural section replacing
various similar provisions in existing
Section 1 dealing specially with each
type of initiative petition. The Secretary
of State must submit initiative statutes or
constitutional amendments at special or
general elections; the Governor may call
special elections for this purpose.
Existing language requires submission of
pending initiative measures at any
special election called for placing
measures proposed by the Legislature
before the electorate. Legislative Counsel
indicated the provision was unnecessary
because section requires that the
Secretary of State present any pending
measures to the electorate at the next
succeeding election whether it be special
or general, called by the Legislature or
by the Governor. Legislative Counsel
Opinion No. 6865, Aug. 27, 1964Y 4
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1976, Article II, Section Eight, subdivision (c):
[unchanged from 1966]
The primary election, established in 1909, was in
effect at the time that the Progressives drafted
the amendment in 1911. They used only the
terms "general" or "special" when referring to
an election. General elections are those held in
November.

Amending Statutory Initiatives
The language of current subdivision (c) of
Section Ten, Article II has changed principally to
modernize phraseology and simplify structure.
1911, Article IV, Section One, (paragraph six,
sentence two)
No act, law, or amendment to the
Constitution, initiated or adopted by the
people, shall be subject to the veto
power of the Governor, and no act, law
or amendment to the Constitution,
adopted by the people at the polls under
the initiative provisions of this section,
shall be amended or repealed except by
a vote of the electors, unless otherwise
provided in said initiative measure; but
acts and laws adopted by the people
under the referendum provisions of this
section may be amended by the
Legislature at any subsequent session
thereof.
1946, Article IV, Section One, subdivision (b)
Laws may be enacted by the Legislature
to amend of repeal any act adopted by
vote of the people under the initiative; to
become effective only when submitted to
and approved by the electors unless the
initiative act affected permits the
amendment or the repeal without such
approval. The Legislature shall by law
prescribe the method and manner of
submitting such a proposal to the
electors.
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1966, Article IV, Section Twenty-Four,
subdivision (c)
The Legislature may amend or repeal
referendum statutes. It may amend or
repeal an initiative statute by another
statute that becomes effective only when
approved by the electors unless the
initiative statute permits amendment or
repeal without their approval.
Constitution Revision Commission Draft Report,
1965 Comments:
consolidates portions of the sixth
paragraph of existing Section 1 with
existing Section lb. No substantive
change has been made; language has
been simplified and phraseology
improved. The last sentence of existing
section lb is unnecessary in view of
proposed subdivision and has been
deleted. Section lb was added to the
Constitution in 1946 to eliminate any
question as to the power of the
Legislature to propose to the people an
amendment to a statute adopted under
the initiative process. 115
1976, Article It Section Ten, subdivision (c)
[unchanged from 1966]

Legislative Review of Initiatives
There is no applicable current constitutional
reference to legislative review of initiative
constitutional amendments or initiative statutes.
(Legislative enactment of initiative statute~ and
constitutional amendments seems contradictory
since initiatives are the popular equivalent of
statutes and constitutional amendments which
originate in the legislature). The closest
reference to legislative review of popular
initiatives can be found in the "indirect
initiative."

-----------------------------~
The Progressives provided for two initiative
processes in the 1911 constitutional amendment:
the direct initiative and the indirect initiative.
The direct initiative is in use today, but for lack
of use, the Constitution Revision Commission
recommended that the indirect initiative be
abolished in 1965. Proposition 1A (ACA 13),
ratified by the voters on November 8, 1966
repealed the indirect initiative provision (Article
IV, Section One, paragraph three).

the Legislature. If any law proposed by
such petition shall be enacted by the
Legislature it shall be subject to
referendum, as hereinafter provided. If
any law so petitioned for be rejected, or
if no action is taken upon it by the
Legislature within said 40 days, the
Secretary of State shall submit it to the
people for approval or rejection at the
next ensuing general election.

Using the indirect initiative, voters could
propose legislation to the legislature. Qualifying
petitions had to contain signatures of registered
voters equal to five percent of the votes cast for
Governor at the last general election. The
Secretary of State sent the petition to the
legislature, which had forty days to either enact
or reject the unchanged initiative, or amend it. If
the Legislature approved the proposal without
amendment, it became law. If the Legislature
did not approve the proposal without
amendment or if the Legislature rejected it the
Secretary of State had to submit it to the voters
at the next general election. The indirect
initiative also provided for competing legislative
enactments on the same subject.

The Legislature may reject any measure
so proposed by initiative petition and
propose a different one on the same
subject by a yea and nay vote upon
separate roll calt and in such event both
measures shall be submitted by the
Secretary of State to the electors for
approval or rejection at the next ensuing
general election or at a prior special
election called by the Governor, in his
discretion, for such purpose. All said
initiative petitions last above described
shall have printed in 12-point black-face
type the following: "Initiative measure to
be presented to the Legislature."

The text of the indirect initiative as originally
drafted and ratified in 1911 follows (note the
provision for legislative competing enactments
in the section):
Upon the presentation to the Secretary of
State, at any time not less than 10 days
before the commencement of any regular
session of the Legislature, of a petition
certified as herein provided to have been
signed by qualified electors of the State
equal in number to 5 per cent of all the
votes cast for all candidates for Governor
at the last preceding general election, at
which a Governor was elected,
proposing a law set forth in full in said
petition, the Secretary of State shall
transmit the same to the Legislature as
soon as it convenes and organizes. The
law proposed by such petition shall be
either enacted or rejected without change
or amendment by the Legislature, within
40 days from the time it is received by

In its 1965 Draft Report, the Constitution
Revision Commission succinctly explained why
it recommended repeal of the indirect initiative:
Because the percentage of signatures
required for proposing an initiative
statute has been reduced and because
there have been but four instances where
an indirect initiative-that is, a petition
to the Legislature, not to the people-has
been utilized (and only once
successfully), the Commission
recommends repeal of the indirect
initiative procedure. 116
It is perhaps applicable to this inquiry to note

that the Constitution Revision Commission had
considered insertion of some provision for
judicial review of initiatives and referendums in
the constitutional amendment of 1966, but
decided not to proceed. Commission comment
follows:
Inclusion of a provision for judicial
review of the initiative (or referendum)
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petition or ballot title and summary was
considered. It is not necessary to include
such a provision because an elector
already has that right. Legislative
Counsel Opinion No. 6863, Sept. 14,
1964. Also it is inadvisable to stipulate
the standard of accuracy or impartiality
for the petition or ballot title and

Page 38- State Governance

summary. The required standard should
be left to the courts in the event an
elector petitions for review of either
item. Additionally, any requirement that
the ballot title and summary be identical
with that appearing on the petition
should be added to the Elections
CodeY 7
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STATE BUDGET AND FISCAL PROVISIONS
by Amanda Meeker

An Overview of the Early Years of the Budget Process
The budget was not a major part of the 1849
California constitution, nor did the issue much
engage the framers in debate. They made some
brief provisions for a fiscal system, most of
which they borrowed from other states'
constitutions.
Without debate, they adopted a provision from
the Iowa state constitution that money could
only be drawn from the treasury through
appropriations made by law. 1 They did not
include specifics on the appropriations process.
The one major fiscal provision outside of
taxation was that the state could not contract
any debt in excess of $300,000. There was some
debate on the amount to be specified in this
section, which was initially set at $100,000, a
sum borrowed from the Iowa constitution. 2 The
committee actually declared that it was "not
particular" about the sum, but "thought it
necessary to specify some definite amount." 3
Some members of the convention felt that the
$100,000 limit was too low, especially since it
would be some time before a tax could be
collected for the new government. Others
disagreed for various reasons. One delegate
opposed any public debt at all, arguing that "if
we could not carry on our State Government
without contracting a debt of that magnitude,
we were certainly starting wrong." 4 Two men
optimistically opined that in all likelihood no
debt at all would be created after the
government got on its feet, no matter what
amount the Constitution permitted. 5 The
convention finally settled on the sum of
$300,000 as a compromise between the initially
proposed $100,000 and a counterproposal of
$500,000.
The constitution did allow for exceptions to this
provision, however. In cases of war, invasion, or
insurrection the limit could be automatically

exceeded. These exceptions would have been
particularly relevant to the framers since the
territory had very recently been wrested from
Mexico, and since troubles with Native
Americans persisted. It was in fact used to
justify the issuance of Indian War bonds in
1852. 6 In addition, the limit could be exceeded if
the state passed a law "for some single object"
that included specifications of the ways and
means to discharge the debt within twenty
years. Such a law could take effect only if a
majority of voters ratified it.
The optimists who predicted that the new state
would remain free of debt were incorrect; by
December 1850 the total state debt amounted to
$485,460.28, and by the next December it
exceeded $2 million? The exceeding of the
constitutional limit for the most part was not
occasioned by war or insurrection, nor had the
voters ratified it or even been asked to consider
it. Yet it continued to climb. Finally, a farmer
who opposed the building of a new road took
the matter to court, and in 1855 the California
Supreme Court declared all debt in excess of
$300,000 unconstitutional. 8 In order to maintain
its good standing, the state had to pay off the
debts as quickly as possible.
When a new constitution was adopted in 1879,
several of the old fiscal provisions were retained
while more specific provisions regarding the
budget were added. Despite the apparent
inadequacy of the 1849 Constitution's debt
clause, the delegates to the 1879 Constitutional
Convention retained the $300,000 state debt
limit. The prohibition against government debt
reflected the delegates' general distrust of the
legislature. In the same vein, the delegates
added various specific prohibitions against state
spending. For example, they prohibited any
public money from being used to support
sectarian causes. Each general appropriation bill
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was to include only items to pay the salaries of
state officers, the expenses of state government
and institutions under government control. One
delegate drew upon his own experience in the
legislature to explain the problem they sought to
avoid by this clause. He noted that people
wanting state funds for their causes would "get
their friends in the legislature to demand that
these appropriations be included, or they will
fail to appropriate anything for the sustenance
of the state government." 9 Another agreed:
"The general appropriation bill must be acted
upon and passed by itself. It should not be
cumbered up with extraneous matter that
would delay its passage until the last moments
of the session." 10
Another change was made at the 1879
convention regarding the budget process. The
1849 constitution had provided for annual
legislative sessions, accompanied by annual
budgets, primarily because the framers at
Monterey felt that the new state would have a
great deal of business to attend to, at least for
the first few years. By 1862, however, the pace
had slowed, and the legislature switched to
biennial sessions and budgetsY The 1879
constitution retained the biennial schedule. This
move went along with a general feeling that
minimal government was best. No one wanted
career politicians representing them in the
legislature.
In the years since the 1879 convention, issues
concerning the state debt have sporadically
reemerged. In 1908 an amendment changed the
period in which the debt would have to be
repaid from twenty years to seventy-five. Then
in 1956 the period was revised downward again
to fifty years, based on the reasoning that in
seventy-five years the interest payments would
exceed the principal paymentsY A 1962
amendment put further strictures on the
creation of debt by requiring a two-thirds vote
in each house of the legislature, instead of a
simple majority, before a bond measure could be
submitted to the voters.
The budget process was changed significantly
by a 1922 initiative amendment. Sponsored by
the Commonwealth Club of California, it
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instituted an appropriations process much the
same as it exists todayY The governor was to
submit a budget bill to the legislature within the
first thirty days of the session. In order to
remedy the problems that had arisen when the
legislature had formerly appropriated money
without having to consider the funds available
to meet the appropriations, the governor's
budget was to be accompanied by a statement
of estimated revenues for the biennium. 14 A
budget bill was then to be introduced into each
house. This bill was the only one that could
include more than one item of appropriation. As
a matter of expedience, the governor was given
the power to reduce or eliminate any items of
expenditure in the budget bill passed by the
legislature. Maryland's budget process, which
had been adopted in 1916, served as a model for
California's new executive budget. It was
suggested that the new process would "save
money because all appropriations will be
handled in a business way, duplications
prevented, and extravagance avoided." 15
A major overhaul of the state's fiscal system
occurred in the 1933 with the Riley-Stewart
amendment. The state was, of course, in the
midst of a severe depression, and many people
were finding it more and more difficult to pay
their property taxes. The amendment's focus
was on changing the system of taxation, but it
also affected the budget. It provided that funds
for the public school system would be set aside
before any other appropriations were made,
thus making the budget process somewhat less
flexible by increasing the percentage of state
spending that was constitutionally fixed. 16 The
goal of this provision was to shift some of the
school tax burden from the counties to the
stateY Another provision divided state and
local taxation by designating that tax revenues
from certain professions could be used only for
state purposes, while freeing those professions
from local taxation. 18 Most important for the
budget process was the provision that general
fund appropriations for any biennium,
excluding school appropriations, could not
exceed by more than 5 percent the appropriations for the previous biennium unless
approved by a two-thirds vote of each house of
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the legislature. 19 Since budget growth after 1933
almost always exceeded 5 percent, this
provision made the budget bill essentially
require a super-majority for passage.
Riley-Stewart also provided that not more than
25 percent of total appropriations could be
raised through property taxes. The
consequences of the Riley-Stewart amendment,
though significant, were not necessarily
intended. Its backers primarily wanted relief
from "confiscatory" property taxes, though
increasing the proportion of state aid for schools
and slowing government spending were also
important. 20 In 1962 an amendment removed
the 5 percent formula, instead simply calling for
a two-thirds vote on the budget bilL This move
merely recognized the existing effect of the
Riley-Stewart provisions. As the ballot argument
in favor of the measure pointed out, "the
removal of the formula will not change the
practical effect of this constitutional provision."
The amendment was included with several
other deletions to "remove obsolete,
superfluous, or superseded provisions." 21
Unprecedented growth during World War II
made an annual budget seem necessary to
"eliminate excessive spending and waste in
government." The biennial budget forced
legislators to guess up to two years in advance
what expenditures would be necessary and
what revenues would be available, a task
that seemed increasingly difficult in the
"fast-moving world" of the 1940s. In the
biennium 1943-45, budget estimates had been
off, resulting in excess revenues of over
$200 million. 22 As a result, an amendment was
adopted that provided for an annual budget, to
be introduced within the first thirty days of the
general session, held in odd-numbered years,
and within the first three days of the budget
session, held in even-numbered years.
Amendment backers argued that an annual
budget would allow the people more control
over state finances and would allow the
legislature to meet unforeseen emergencies?3 In
1949 the budget session was limited to thirty
days in order to make lawmakers "get down to
the brass tacks work of the session sooner." 24
Through the work of the constitution revision

commission, in 1966 a general overhaul of the
article on the legislature abolished the separate
budget session. Instead, the legislature was to
meet in annual general sessions, at which the
budget would be considered along with general
legislation.
The two-thirds vote requirement regarding the
budget drew considerable debate at the
meetings of the constitutional revision
commission in the 1960s and 1970s. In 1966 the
minority position argued that "what they
intended in 1933 was that the annual financing
plan could be passed by majority vote" while
only excess appropriations would require a
two-thirds vote. They also pointed out that "in
most cases where extraordinary majority votes
are required, the presumption is that we would
be better off having no action at all in the event
that any substantial minority so desires," while
it was imperative to pass a budget. 25 The
majority of the commissioners, however,
concluded that the two-thirds vote was
necessary to protect the different interests of
urban versus rural and north versus south. 26
The topic resurfaced in 1970, when several
commission members expressed opinions that
the provision was anachronistic, while others
suggested that the requirement might be a
violation of the federal constitution. In another
context, the California Supreme Court had
recently ruled that giving one-third of the voters
the power to veto a measure effectively gave
them double the voting power of the other
voters?7 As one commissioner put it, "our
commission, whose function is to create a
modern, revised constitution, cannot vote to
include an unconstitutional provision." 28
Additionally, they recognized that the
two-thirds vote requirement "is going to subject
the minority party, whichever party it is, to the
temptation to vote to some extent on purely
partisan considerations on the single most
important proposal that comes before the
legislature year by year." 29 Another impetus for
the discussion on the issue in 1970 was the fact
that the legislature had the year before, for the
first time, failed to enact a budget by July 1, the
start of the fiscal year. Several commissioners
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advocated a majority vote for the budget based
on the fact that the super-majority vote had
"proved to be in effect a political weapon in the
hands of the legislative r::hinority." 30 Others,
however, argued that it was the only means the
minority party had to stop unwanted
appropriations, and that if the vote
requirements were changed, "the next thing you
are going to have is the simple majority on bond
issues on the ballot and the taxpayers again will
be at the mercy of those people who don't own
any property." 31 The amendment as ultimately
ratified did not change the super-majority
requirement.
Another amendment of 1970 allowed the
legislature to raise interest rates on unsold
bonds in order to increase their marketability.
The goal was to make sure that
already-approved bonds to finance various state
projects would be sold. As the amendment's
proponents pointed out, the only alternative, an
unpleasant one, was "pay-as-you-go financing"
and higher taxes. 32
Yet another 1970 amendment required the
governor to submit the budget within the first
ten days of the legislative session, instead of
within thirty days, and required the legislature
to pass a budget by June 15, two weeks in
advance of the new fiscal year. This action was
based on the failure of the legislature to enact a
budget by the start of the fiscal year in 1969 and
1970. The amendment's supporters surmised
that the extra three weeks in January would
allow legislators more time to consider the
budget and that the early mandatory deadline
would force the legislature to enact the budget
in plenty of time before the fiscal year began. 33
As recent events have demonstrated, problems
with the budget have continued despite these
changes.
A major part of the problem with the budget
process has been that although related to the
budget bill, the budget implementation bills are
governed by what is known as the single-subject
rule and must be considered individually, rather
than as a package. Since the 1849 Constitution,
all bills except for the budget have been
required to pertain to a single subject, which
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must be expressed in its title, a requirement
borrowed from the Iowa constitution and
adopted by the California delegates without
debate. The framers thereby sought to prevent
wily legislators from getting provisions enacted
by hiding them in popular legislation. Most
delegates to the 1879 convention, with their
anti-legislature sentiments, also believed
strongly in the necessity of such a provision. As
one explained, "in the careless way in which
legislation is carried on, mischievous provisions
may slip in, unless you have such a provision as
this in the Constitution." 34 An opposing
argument unsuccessfully countered that since
they were providing that bills would be read on
three different days, "no member of the
Legislature could be voting under a trick." 35
The provision as it stood in the first
constitution, however, had not been entirely
successful. One delegate to the 1879 convention
described having seen a bill on a general subject
that included, somewhere near the middle, a
provision to purchase a toll-bridge across the
Sacramento River. 36 Another delegate pointed
out that while in some instances there was
legitimate reason to join two subjects in one bill,
as it stood in the old constitution the whole bill
would be void if it contained more than one
subject. He cited a case in the previous
legislative session in which a bill was declared
void because it dealt with both the maintenance
of booms in the Elk River and the removal of
obstructions from that river. 37 Based upon such
arguments, the convention concluded that if
such legislation were passed, the portion not
expressed in the title would be void, while the
rest of the law would remain valid.
The application of the single-subject rule to the
budget trailer bills has also resulted in
confusion. Although the budget bill itself may
be enacted, some important part of the
legislation necessary to make the budget work
can be omitted. To address this issue, a
proposition was submitted to the voters in 1993
that would have permitted the budget trailer
bills to be consolidated into one bill. Proponents
argued that the amendment would promote
timely passage of the budget and would stop
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special interests from "exploiting the
fragmented budget process." The opposition
countered that the amendment would make it
easier to raise taxes because it would make the

budget bill harder to understand, an argument
that the voters evidently found sufficiently
convincing to reject the proposition. 38
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Reform During Crisis: The Transformation of California's
Fiscal System During the Great Depression
witnessed as dramatic a set of changes in state
tax structures and fiscal systems generally.

Abstract
In the midst of the Great Depression, California
engaged in a massive restructuring of its tax
system, reducing the reliance on the property
tax and introducing sales and income taxes. Our
analysis suggests that this restructuring, which
included a voter referendum, was primarily
driven by a desire to change the mix rather than
the level of taxation. Nonetheless, by
introducing new taxes that had a higher revenue
elasticity than the existing taxes, California
created a revenue system that allowed the rapid
growth of spending to continue.
Economic historians have been keenly interested
in the acceleration of governments' growth
during the Great Depression. Robert Higgs
argues that both the size and powers of
government grow during perceived crises and
that the Great Depression provides a classic
example of this phenomenon. 1 John Wallis
highlights both the growth of federal
government at the expense of local government
and the growth of state government during the
1930s.2 He emphasizes the incentives provided
by federal grants to change the nature of and
size of government programs, particularly in the
area of agricultural price supports and public
welfare.
In this paper, we focus on an alternative
explanation for the growth of state government
in the 1930s: the modernization of the tax
systems that occurred during the very early part
of the Great Depression. Voters, legislators, and
government officials transformed state and local
fiscal systems throughout the United States
during the Great Depression. Retail sales taxes
were introduced at a rapid rate during this
period. Of the 46 states that now have retail
sales taxes, 24 initiated them during the 1930s,
the vast majority by 1933? Many states also
introduced personal income taxes during this
period. No other decade in this century has

Since the fiscal changes in the states occurred
early in the 1930s, they potentially could
constitute a third independent factor leading to
the growth of government. The majority of these
changes occurred before the bulk of the federal
grant programs were implemented. To the
extent that the modernization of the state tax
systems permitted higher, sustained revenue
growth by increasing the elasticity of the tax
systems, they can also account for the "ratchet"
effect emphasized by Higgs whereby the growth
of government powers continues after the crisis
appears to end.
What led to the modernization of state tax
systems in the 1930s? Robert Haig and Carl
Shoup discuss the variety of economic and
political factors that led to the adoption of the
sales tax throughout the country during this
period. 4 Along with a team of researchers, they
closely analyzed the economic and political
developments in the states. Based on this
detailed research they believed it was not
possible to explain the spread of the sales tax
with reference to a single source of revenue or
expenditure. 5
Other research highlights the diversity of factors
that led twenty states to adopt broad based sales
taxes between 1931 and 1938. Based on an
econometric investigation, Kim Rueben suggests
that states with more severe employment
declines and strict balanced budget
requirements were more likely to adopt sales
taxes. 6 In general, however, she found only
weak effects from economic variables. Jens
Jensen, a contemporary observer, emphasized
the role of property tax limitations? He pointed
out that in 1934 all eight states that had
previously adopted property tax limitations had
enacted retail sales taxes as compared to only
nine of the other 40 states. 8
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Because of these conflicting perspectives, it is
valuable to examine in- depth the fiscal history
of an important state. The changes in the
California fiscal system during the 1930s were
as dramatic as anywhere in the country. In 1933,
voters approved an initiative measure (the
Riley-Stewart constitutional amendment) that
quickly led to a major restructuring of the entire
state and local system, the immediate
introduction of a retail sales tax, and the
introduction of a personal income tax two years
later. The fiscal system enacted in California
during the 1930s has persisted in its basic
structure through today. 9 These changes have
allowed real per-capita state expenditure to
grow by a factor of approximately 10 from
1929/30 to 1989/90.
A close examination of the California experience
reveals that this fiscal transformation was
neither preordained nor intended as a means to
allow government to grow. Although the
restructuring of the fiscal system did allow
government to grow rapidly over the next
several decades, raising additional revenue was
not the intention behind most of the fiscal
changes undertaken during the Great
Depression. Voters were primarily interested in
changing the mix of taxes, indeed provisions for
expenditure limitations were part of the
Riley-Stewart amendment
The actions that were taken during this period
were dramatic, unpredictable, and potentially
risky. For example, the 1933 Riley-Stewart
initiative required the state to give up its
principal revenue source for financing the
General Fund at a time in which it was widely
acknowledged that there was a large General
Fund deficit and without an explicit source to
replace the lost revenue. On the same ballot,
voters also overwhelmingly rejected a measure
to use proceeds from the state's special fund
(replete with revenue from taxes on gasoline) to
redeem highway bonds and meet interest
payments.
Four factors emerge from a careful examination
of California's fiscal history during the early

phases of the Great Depression that are crucial
to understanding the fiscal transformation. First,
there was an extremely rapid growth of
government expenditures during the late 1920s
and continuing into the 1930s. The growth of
these expenditures was common knowledge but
political actors deemed some of this expenditure
growth "uncontrollable." Second, the state's
taxation of utilities was widely viewed as
unsatisfactory and there were strong advocates
of change in the name of pure tax reform. Third,
intergovernmental relations were central to the
debate. The role of the state in financing
elementary and secondary education was a key
focus of political controversy. Finally, and
closely related to the question of
intergovernmental relations, were issues
concerning the structure of taxation. There was
general support for property tax relief but deep
divisions over the sources of revenue to support
this relief and over the mechanisms that needed
to be enacted to ensure that the property tax
reform was to be lasting.
This article explores the role of these four
factors-expenditure growth, pure tax reform,
intergovernmental relations, and, most
importantly, a change in the desired mix of
taxation-in California's fiscal transformation. It
also examines the consequences of the
modernization of the tax system for closing the
deficits that emerged during the 1930s and
sustaining revenue growth which allowed for
large increases in government spending in later
years.
The following sections analyze the fiscal
structure prior to the Great Depression, the
rapid growth of government spending, the
voting behavior for the Riley-Stewart initiative,
and possible fiscal alternatives to major
structural changes in taxation. The article
concludes by contrasting traditional political
histories of California during the Great
Depression with its innovative and tumultuous
fiscal history. We also reflect on the implications
of the change in elasticity of the state's tax
system for its future economic growth.
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An Overview of California Fiscal History
During the Depression
In the period 1929/30, total state revenue
was approximately $114.6 million of which
$65.3 million was in the general fund and
$49.3 million was in special funds that were
pnimarily for motor vehicle related
expenditures. Tax revenues for the general fund
came principally from four sources: gross
receipts taxes on public utilities (52.5 percent),
inheritance and gift taxes (17.8 percent), the
bank and corporation franchise tax (10.5
percent), and the insurance gross premiums tax
(10.2 percent). Special fund revenues were
largely derived from taxes on motor fuels and
motor vehicles. 10 Local governments were
primarily financed from the property tax. Cities,
counties, and special districts would each level
their own property taxes.
The most unusual part of the this tax structure
was the heavy reliance on a gross receipts tax on
utilities to provide general revenues. This tax
originated in 1910 from a prior tax reform effort
There were difficulties with the tax from its
beginning. The primary problem was that the
relationship of net income to gross receipts
varied across classes of utilities, varied across
different sizes of utilities within the same class,
and also varied over time. In 1929, a tax
commission documented these differences
thoroughly and recommended abolishing the
gross receipts tax. The commission advocated
that utility property be returned to local
government tax rolls but be assessed by the
state to insure equal treatment across local
jurisdictions. These recommendations were
rejected by a 1931 joint legislative committee;
nonetheless there were well- documented
difficulties with the gross receipts tax. 11
By the early 1930s, demands for property tax
relief became pronounced. The primary demand
was for increased state aid for elementary and
secondary schools, a policy that had been
recommended by the 1931 tax commission.
Groups supporting property tax relief and
increased state aid placed an initiative on the
8 November 1932 general election ballot This

initiative not only provided property tax relief
but permitted the introduction of personal
income taxes and a sales tax. It was defeated by
a nearly 2-1 vote.
Early in the next year, Governor Rolph faced the
first state fiscal crisis of the depression. At the
end of fiscal year 1930/31, the state had a
general fund surplus of approximately
$31.5 million. By January of 1933, this surplus
had disappeared and a $10 million deficit
balance was projected for June 1933. The
governor's budget message in January also
predicted an additional deficit of $66 million for
the 1933-35 biennium if no actions were takenY
The governor's own proposals were ignored and
the legislature worked through the spring in
fashioning a budget and the language for the
Riley-Stewart initiative.
The Riley-Stewart initiative, which the voters
approved in a special election on 27 June 1933,
had four main components: public utility
property was to be returned to local property
tax rolls and the gross receipts tax abolished in
1935; the state would provide additional
support for elementary and secondary schools;
limits were to be placed on expenditure
increases both at the state and local levels; and
the Legislature was to be authorized to raise
additional revenue to meet the cost for school
aid. The source of this revenue was not
described in the initiative but it was generally
acknowledged that a sales tax would be
necessary.
After the Riley-Stewart amendment passed by
nearly a two to one margin, the Legislature
faced an enlarged state deficit from the
additional school aid. It quickly adopted a retail
sales tax based on New York's model and also
gassed a personal income tax. The personal
income tax was vetoed by the governor. There
were other revenue increases as well, but these
were insufficient to cover expenditures during
the biennium and the state fiscal situation
continued to deteriorate.
In the beginning of 1935, Governor Frank
Merriam estimated that the carryover general
fund deficit balance would be $29 million and
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that an additional $95 million was needed to
balance his proposed budget The deficit was
exacerbated by the loss of the gross receipts tax.
He proposed an increase in taxes of $107 million
that included instituting a personal income tax
and raising the sales tax rate from two percent
to three percent These changes constituted
roughly half of the total tax increase with the
remainder coming from increases in rates of
other taxes. The Legislature adopted his policy
and Merriam was able to return in two years
without asking for a tax increase. 13 During the
late 1930s, the state again incurred large deficits
but they were quickly erased during the
build-up and early phases of World War II. No
other taxes were introduced during the 1930s.
The state did have to borrow extensively during
the 1930s and began issuing registered warrants
in November of 1933 at an initial interest rate of
5 percent, a rate comparable that paid on AAA
corporate bonds. (Short-term US securities paid
less than 1 percent) Initially there was no public
market for the warrants but most banks did
accept them. The outstanding stock of registered
warrants reached a peak of over $98 million in
July of 1940; shortly thereafter a rapidly
improving economy created fiscal surpluses that
allowed the warrants to be retired. 14

leaving state coffers. Tables 1 and 2 report data
on General Fund revenues and
expenditures-the focus of budget crises-while
Table 3 reports data on expenditures from
1926-36 based on the cost of government series.

The Growth of Government Expenditure

Another common way of measuring budget
trends is in expenditure or revenues per $100 of
personal income. Table 2 presents these trends
from 1929/30 through the 1930s. From 1929/30
to 1933/34, General Fund expenditures per $100
of state personal income rose each year. The
increase in General Fund expenditures was from
about $1.29 to $3.23. Total state expenditures
(not included in this table) followed a similar
pattern.

The budget crises of the early 1930s were
precipitated by the rapid growth of spending
relative to revenue. During this period, there
was also a vigorous debate over whether
government expenditures were controllable.
General Fund revenues and expenditures-the
most common measure of the fiscal health of the
state-are available on a consistent basis only
for the 1930s. During the 1920sthe only
consistent series for government spending is
based on the "cost of government." 15 The
primary difference between cost of government
and what is termed state expenditures is the
treatment of funds which are merely shifted
from one state account to another state account
Such transfers are counted as state expenditures
but not as costs of government Thus, cost of
government is an accurate measure of funds

Table 1 summarizes nominal and real growth in
General Fund expenditures and revenues which
occurred from the 1929/30 through the end of
the 1930s. The top panel contains the nominal
figures. There were three distinct fiscal periods:
rapid growth of revenues and expenditures in
the 1920s, sharply reduced growth of revenues
in the early 1930s, and a later resumption of
growth of revenues and expenditures through
the remainder of the decade.
This basic pattern also applies to real
magnitudes. From 1925/26 through 1929/30,
real total spending (as measured by the cost of
government) rose by an average of 11 percent
per year. From 1930/31 through 1932/33, real
General Fund expenditures grew by 14 percent
while revenues fell by 8 percent The increases
were greater and the declines were less in
constant dollars than in current dollars because
of the price deflation that occurred in the early
1930s. For 1932/33 through 1940/41, real
General Fund spending grew by 10 and real
revenues grew by 18 percent.

From 1929/30 to 1933/34, total state revenues
per $100 of personal income also steadily drifted
up and then continued to rise to over $5.20 by
1937/38. Similarly, General Fund revenues were
considerably higher per $100 of personal income
in 1933/34 ($2.51) than in 1929/30 ($1.29), and
reached $3.60 by 1937/38.
In summary, expenditures and revenues
increased at rapid rates prior to the depression.
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During the early years of the 1930s, revenues
did decline, but expenditures continued to rise,
especially in constant-dollar terms. Expenditures
and revenues as a share of the state's economic
base also rose during the first half of the 1930s,
and revenues per $100 of personal income
continued to rise throughout most of the
decade. These findings indicate that, over the
course of the decade, neither reducing state
expenditures nor reducing assistance to local
governments were the primary tools used to
deal with the fiscal crises spawned by the
depression. Debt and the introduction of new
taxes were the policy tools chosen.
The rapid growth of spending in the late 1920s
and early 1930s triggered a debate as to whether
government spending was actually controllable.
As noted above, this was a period of rapid
growth for the California state budget. In the
four years after 1925, total state spending
rose by 45 percent. By 1931, it had risen by
70 percent.
As the Great Depression set in, state spending
did not slow appreciably; it continued to grow
at an average of 8 percent per year in 1930-1932.
While in nominal terms it appears that the state
did rein in spending to some degree, real
spending increased sharply because the price
level fell in the early years of the depression.
Thus, the onset of the Great Depression did little
to slow the growth of state spending. However,
it did have a very large impact on the overall
budget situation because state revenues
deteriorated sharply in the early 1930s.
In the late 1920s, tax revenues were rising by an
average of 11 percent per year. Since the overall
budget was in surplus during this time, there
was more than enough additional tax revenue to
pay for the increased spending. However, in the
early 1930s, total tax revenues fell by an average
of 1 percent per year resulting in large deficits.
It was not any particular part of the budget that
was growing. Spending was increasing across
the board. Table 3 reports the growth rates of
nominal spending (using cost of government
series) by programmatic category as well as
total and average growth rates for selected

periods. In the late 1920s, construction and
corrections were growing the fastest In the early
1930s, protection, regulation, and benevolence
grew at a particularly rapid rate.
Government officials frequently claimed that the
budget crisis was out of their control. In his
budget message in 1933, Governor Rolph
lamented that "existing laws call for
expenditures which make it impossible for the
Chief Executive alone to solve the problem of
presenting a balanced budget without increasing
taxes. . . . The Governor of the State of
California has control over only approximately
27 percent of the total budget The remaining
73 percent of expenditures is fixed by law, in
other words, by the Legislature and the people.
Even though the Governor should desire to
reduce materially this 73 percent of the
expenditures he is without power to do so." 16
However, the definition of "fixed" charges in
the above statements is rather elastic. It
conflates two different types of expenditure.
Certain charges were fixed by the California
Constitution, for example, interest payments
and education expenditures. It is legitimate to
consider these expenditures beyond the control
of the Legislature. However, the definition of
fixed charges used above also encompassed
what today is commonly called continuing
appropriations. These expenditures were
established by the Legislature in previous years
and thus could be changed or eliminated by the
Legislature. Examples of these types of
expenditures included aid to the blind, aid to
the aged, aid for vocational education, aid for
adult education, salaries of Superior Court
judges, and subsidies to hospitals for
tuberculosis. 17
What portion of the budget was constitutionally
fixed and thus truly beyond the control of the
Legislature? Using the Reports of the State
Controller, we calculated the fixed charges
during this period. 18 Until1934, only about
30 percent of all state spending was
constitutionally fixed. However, a better
measure of the role of fixed spending focuses on
the General Fund since the budget crisis was a
crisis of the General Fund. Until 1934, close to
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half of the total expenditures from the General
Fund were constitutionally fixed. The
Riley-Stewart Amendment increased this
percentage for subsequent years. Out of these
fixed expenditures, nearly 80 percent went to
education and another 16 percent were paid out
as interest The budget problems cannot be
blamed on rapid growth in fixed spending; from
Table 3 we can see that spending on education
grew at a slower rate than the overall budget
Fixed charges were only part of the problem.
There was clearly a deep-seated reluctance to
change the "continuing appropriations."
California residents and public officials had
become accustomed to growing public
expenditures.

Understanding the Riley-Stewart
Amendment
The single most critical event in California's
fiscal history during the depression was the
passage of the Riley-Stewart constitutional
amendment. As noted above, California
immediately adopted a retail sales tax after the
amendment's passage and a personal income
tax two years later. These changes put in place a
revenue system that would permit rapid growth
in government for decades. However,
developing an elastic revenue system was not
the motivating factor for the passage of
Riley-Stewart it emerged as a response to
growing voter discontent over the property tax
during the Great Depression.
As personal income fell during the depression,
property tax delinquencies rose in California as
they did throughout the country. California
experienced less severe problems than did many
other jurisdictions. In Los Angeles County, for
example, the percentage of uncollected levies
rose from 4.3 percent in 1931-32 to 10.1 percent
in 1932-33. This was a far cry from the
experience in the midwest with a 37.6 percent
rate in Milwaukee in 1931-32 and a 40.6 percent
rate and widespread tax resistance in Chicago in
1931-32. 19 Nonetheless, there were persistent
demands for property tax relief emerging in
California.

As Haig and Shoup and Stockwell discuss, real
estate interests began to promote limitations on
ad valorem taxation, county officials sought
state relief from mandated school expenditures
which they believed should be assumed by the
state and financed with a sales tax, and farm
interests favored personal income taxation.Z 0
These groups finally coalesced around
Proposition 9 which was placed on the general
election ballot of November 8, 1932.
This initiative would have provided relief to
counties for elementary and secondary school
which would have enabled the counties to
reduce property taxes. However, it also
introduced both a personal income tax and a
selective sales tax, as well as mandated that
teachers' salaries be a fixed percentage of total
educational expenditures.
Critics attacked the proposal along several
dimensions, in particular arguing that this
amendment increased mandated expenditures
in bad economic times.Z 1 Furthermore, the issue
was poorly "fram~d" for the voters. 22 The
measure as it appeared on the ballot
emphasized new taxes, new spending, and
ear-marked expenditures for teacher salaries.
No mention was given to the potential for
substantial property tax relief that would occur
as counties were relieved of required support
payments for schools. Proposition 9 was
defeated by a vote of 1,1144,449 to 552,738.
In early 1933, Governor Rolph faced the
daunting task of developing a budget plan for
the 1933-35 biennium. As noted above, on a
current-law basis there was a $66 million dollar
deficit plus a $10 million deficit carryover from
the prior biennium. His proposed budget aimed
to close these gaps without tax increases. His
recommendations included $24 million in
reductions in operating budgets and
streamlining, $23 million transferred from the
special highway fund to the General Fund, a
constitutional amendment to reduce state funds
to schools ($12 million) and another amendment
to allow funds from a state education
permanent fund to be used for operating
purposes ($11 million).Z3
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The Director of Finance, Rolland Vandegrift,
provided the justification for these policies.
First, some of the funds transferred from the
highway fund were to be used to pay principal
and interest on highway bonds and thus were
appropriate uses for funds raised by user fees.
The remainder of the money transferred from
the highway fund was premised on the notion
that the highway fund could achieve equal
economies to that which the Governor would
obtain from the general fund operating budget
This transfer was appropriate, he argued,
because we "should be more concerned with the
welfare and happiness of the individual citizen
than we are concerned with the building of
inanimate roads." 24
The most controversial part of the budget was
the proposed twenty percent reduction in state
funds for schools from $30 to $24 per pupil.
Vandegrift offered two arguments in support of
this reduction. First, there had been over a thirty
percent fall in the general price level since 1924
when the $30 amount was placed into the state
constitution. Second, he saw no reason why the
schools could not make twenty percent savings
as the governor proposed for the rest of the
government
Almost every component of the governor's plan
was highly unpopular with either legislators or
the public. For example, in the June 1933
election, voters overwhelming rejected the
notion that highway funds should be used for
General Fund purposes when they voted down
the seemingly innocuous measures to pay
principal and interest on highway bonds from
special funds. The San Francisco Chronicle
regularly editorialized against what it perceived
to be this raid on highway funds during the
period preceding the election.Z5 Its position was
perhaps not too surprising given that both the
Bay Bridge and Golden Gate Bridge were under
construction. To voters and legislators,
reductions in state support of the schools would
inevitably mean higher property taxes. Teachers
also opposed the plan. Since salaries were a
high proportion of school costs, maintaining
property tax rates would have required large
nominal wage reductions.

The governor's plan was ignored by the
Legislature. The State Controller, Ray L Riley,
and a member of the Board of Equalization,
Fred E. Stewart, assumed leadership in the
crisis.Z6 They offered an initial plan which was
substantially changed by the Legislature but
nonetheless bore their names. The resulting
constitutional amendment, which we have
previously described, was offered to the voters
in a special election on 27 June 1933.
Unlike Proposition 9, this measure was ideally
framed and, indeed, seemed to promise
something for all parties. It emphasized
property tax relief through the reduction in
school expenditures by counties and an increase
in the property tax base. Local expenditure
limits were designed to force counties to lower
rates and not increase spending with the higher
tax base. The utility industry would be free of
the gross receipts tax and assessed by the state
at a rate comparable to that for local property.
And despite the fact that new taxes were clearly
on the horizon, the nature of the taxes was
sufficiently ambiguous so that debates about the
relative desirability of income versus sales taxes
could be postponed.
Althouo-h
the ultimate effect of the passage of
b
the Riley-Stewart amendment was to develop an
elastic tax system that would permit the growth
of government, at the time the support for the
initiative was based on very different
considerations. While the proponents of
Proposition 9 (real estate interests, farm
interests, and county officials) also supported
Riley-Stewart, there were new proponents as
well. Utility interests favored Riley-Stewart
because it abolished the gross receipts tax. In
addition, some parties supported Riley-Stewart
in order to restrain government growth.
Taxpayer organizations emphasized the state
and local expenditure limitations and saw this
as a method to restrain government Proponents
of the measure, such as the State Chamber of
Commerce stressed expenditure limitations
27
along with taxpayer property tax rehef.
I

•

On the other hand, some parties viewed this as
a change in the mix or composition of taxes,
away from the property tax to a sales tax. It was

Reform During Crisis: The Transformation of California's Fiscal System During the Great Depression

Page 63

---------------------------------~
commonly recognized that the passage of
Riley-Stewart would bring forth additional state
taxes. The strongest opposition in San Francisco
was from the Retail Dry Goods Association
which opposed a retail sales tax; other
opposition was not well organized.Z8
One way to address the question of whether the
voters were primarily seeking changes in the tax
mix or reductions in the size of government is to
analyze the voting behavior across counties.Z9
There are two parts to our analysis.
We first establish that the vote across counties
was consistent with the direct economic
interests of the voters. The counties differed in
the extent to which they would benefit from the
state assumption of school expenditures and the
return of public utility property to the tax rolls.
Variables measuring these differences can
capture the relative gain from changes in the
mix of taxation. The regressions assume
implicitly that consumers, who ultimately
would bear the burden of a retail sales tax, take
its effects into account as voters. 30 We also
include other background variables in our
baseline regression to capture differences in
voter sentiment across the counties.
We then examine the effects of variables
designed to explore whether the voters also
wanted smaller government To capture this, we
use the fact that the counties differed on the
absolute level of local property taxation and the
rate of growth of property tax rates. If voters
desired a lower level of government awe
hypothesize that those counties with either the
highest tax rates or, alternatively, the most rapid
growing tax rates would be the ones most likely
to vote for the measure. These regressions
implicitly assume that tastes are the same across
the counties; if tastes for public services
differed, higher tax rates could be associated
with a greater demand for public services.
We now turn to the specification of the baseline
regression which establishes that voters were
cognizant of their economic interests. The
dependent variable in this regression is the
percentage of votes in each of the 58 counties in
favor of the Riley-Stewart measure. The first

two independent variables we include are
designed to capture the differences in
ideological positions across counties. These can
be viewed as proxies for "fixed effects" in the
attitudes of voters across counties. The two
variables we chose were the percentage of "yes"
votes for Proposition 9 and the percentage of
registered Republicans. The support for the
prior proposition captures the degree of general
sentiment for radical reform of the property tax
system. The Republican variable captures the
significant but unobserved differences evident
in voting behavior in prior elections between
members of the two parties.
The next two variables in the baseline regression
capture the tax-mix variables. The first is the
ratio of average daily attendance in elementary
schools to the total population. This measure
captures the benefits from the state assumption
of county school costs. The second variable is
the estimated percentage decrease in property
tax rates from the return of utility property to
the rolls. These estimates are derived from data
from the Board of Equalization that was
published in Tax Digest in July of 1935?1 The
other series used in the regressions are also from
Tax Digest. Before discussing the results of this
regression and subsequent tests, there are two
econometric issues that should be addressed.
First, the counties differ sharply in size, Los
Angeles County having over 2 million people
and Alpine County only 241. Although the
variables are scaled relative to population, there
is the potential for heteroskedasticity. Tests for
heteroskedasticity were not significant;
nonetheless, the results reported below are
robust to alternative corrections for
heteroskedasticity?2 Second, the dependent
variable is constrained to lie between zero and
one. Regressions using the transformation in
where x is the percentage "yes" vote, which
allow the dependent variable to be
unconstrained, yielded similar results.
The first column of Table 4 reports the baseline
regression. It has an adjusted R-squared of
32 percent and significant coefficients for the
prior Proposition 9 vote, the percentage of
Republican registrants in the county, and the
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two tax mix variables. One way to measure the
electoral significance of the variables is to
calculate the effect of a one standard deviation
change in each of the variables on the vote
count A one standard deviation increase in the
Proposition 9 vote would increase the
Riley-Stewart vote by 2.9 percentage points
while a one standard deviation increase in the
percentage of Republicans would have a
2.5 percentage point effect. Similar calculations
for the two tax mix variables-average daily
attendance and utility property-lead to a 4 and
2.6 percentage point effect-respectively.

Since San Francisco was and is both a city and a
county, its tax rate exceeded the other county
measures. To insure that this one observation
did not distort the regression, we effectively
removed the observation by adding a dummy
variable for San Francisco and then testing the
1932-33 county tax rate. The tax rate was still
not significant Alternative measures of fiscal
distress (based on failures to meet debt
obligations) were also not significant

The model does significantly over predict the
percentage "yes" vote for San Francisco. But it
would be hard to find a simple model that
would fit San Francisco since its percentage
"yes" vote was 36 compared to the statewide
percentage of 62. San Francisco did have a very
low ratio of school children to overall
population-7.3 percent compared to the
statewide average of 12.8 percent with a
standard deviation of 2.1 percent. It also had a
relatively low percentage of utility property that
would be returned to the rolls. Although we
could find no mention of the school age effect,
editorials in San Francisco (as well as Los
Angeles) remarked that the elimination of the
gross receipts tax would hurt urban areas.

There were several other measures on the ballot
including one allowing special funds from the
gasoline tax to be used to pay principal and
interest on highway bonds. This latter measure
was more prominent in the newspapers than the
Riley-Stewart amendment and the total number
of voters on this measure exceeded total votes
on Riley-Stewart by 4.3 percent However, the
percentage vote by county on this measure had
no explanatory power for the Riley-Stewart vote
in the baseline regression. This continued to be
true even when all the other variables were
excluded from the regression. We also tested the
robustness of our results by excluding the
Proposition 9 variable and adding a dummy
variable for the urban counties of Los Angeles
and San Francisco. These alternative
specifications did not change the basic results.

The remaining columns of Table 4 test for the
hypothesis that the voters wanted lower
government by including alternative measures
of the size or growth rate of the local tax
burden. None of these variables are statistically
significant at conventional confidence levels.
Tests were run for the total property tax burden
(including counties, cities, schools and special
districts) in 1934-35; the county tax rate in
1932-33 (adjusted for assessment ratios in
counties); and the growth of the county tax rate
between 1929-30 and 1932-33. The growth rate
variable was the closest to being statistically
significant (its p- value was 0.20) but its
coefficient was small and negative. The mean
change in this variable in the sample was .60
which translates into a decrease in the
Riley-Stewart vote of .47 percentage points.

The regressions suggest that the vote was
consistent with the direct economic interests of
the counties and that there is no evidence in
support of the view that voters were trying to
reduce the size of government. These results
suggest that the local expenditure limitations in
Riley-Stewart were a means of insuring property
tax relief, not a device to cut the existing
provision of government services. However,
local expenditure limitations provided
important psychological support because of one
technical feature of the initiative. The
Riley-Stewart amendment called for assessment
at "full cash value" because when utility
property was returned to the property tax rolls
it needed to be assessed at similar values across
counties. Since assessments averaged forty-four
percent of market value statewide, there was
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fear, manifest in newspaper editorials, that
existing rates would be maintained and
property tax bills would soar. Expenditure
limitations would prevent this from occurring.
As it turned out, the Board of Equalization
chose a 50 percent assessment ratio as "full cash
value."

restrained spending in the 1930s. Suppose the
Legislature had frozen real spending at its 1930
level, thereby maintaining the expenditure
increases of the 1920s. In that case, the General
Fund would have made it through the Great
Depression without a crisis. (See Table 5,
columns on consent real expenditure). There
would have been a small deficit in 1933, but its
small size coupled with surpluses in earlier
years would have resulted in a General Fund
surplus balance in 1933 that was larger than that
in 1930.

Two cautionary notes about the results. First,
our test for whether voters wanted to change
the mix of taxation or reduce the size or growth
of government is contingent upon our proxies
for variables measuring government's size or
growth. We do not have direct observations on
voters' preferences for the size of government
Second, the regression results do not address the
issue of whether the Riley-Stewart amendment
was engineered by politicians seeking to create a
more elastic tax structure to allow government
spending to continue at rapid rates. While this
is an intriguing possibility (in that spending
grew rapidly in the 1930s), there is no direct
evidence in favor of this hypothesis. Indeed, the
politicians would have had to have fooled the
taxpayer groups who were adamant about the
expenditure limitations in the amendment.
There were suggestions, however, that the Board
of Equalization supported Riley-Stewart because
it gave it a new tax to administer (the retail sales
tax) and because the creation of the Franchise
Tax Board in 1929 had sharply reduced the
powers of the Board. 34

Alternative Budget Strategies
Were the budget problems of the 1930s
avoidable? We previously showed that
California state expenditures grew appreciably
in the early 1930s while tax revenues declined.
Could a more modest expenditure pattern have
avoided the budget crisis altogether or was the
drop in tax revenues so severe that budget
problems were inevitable?
Entering the decade of the 1930s, there was a
surplus balance in the General Fund of about
$33 million. By 1933, annual current year
deficits had depleted this surplus. This
depletion of the General Fund surplus balance
could have been avoided if the Legislature had

Since population was growing in the early
1930s, freezing the aggregate level of real
spending may not be the appropriate
experiment Suppose instead that the Legislature
froze spending at the 1930 level of real per
capita expenditures. This allows for a higher
level of spending in every year than in the
previous experiment In this case, the 1933 deficit
would have been larger than if real spending
was frozen and the surpluses in the other years
would have been smaller. However, the
year-end General Fund surplus would still have
risen between 1930 and 1933. Thus, the
Legislature could have avoided the rapid
depletion of the General Fund surplus balance
in the early years of the depression with
moderate restraint on spending increases.
While the General Fund was experiencing
persistent, large deficits, the Riley-Stewart
amendment overhauled the tax system. We
know that the changes brought about by
Riley-Stewart did not immediately eliminate the
General Fund deficits. Did the Riley-Stewart
changes aggravate or alleviate the imbalance in
the General Fund?
Riley-Stewart affected both expenditures and tax
revenues. On the tax side, the gross receipts tax
was phased out and replaced by sales and
income taxes. On the expenditure side,
additional spending on education was ·
mandated.
To determine what would have happened in the
General Fund if Riley-Stewart had not been
enacted, we need to make several estimates.
First, we need to project what education
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spending would have been in the absence of the
additional mandates of Riley-Stewart We do
this by assuming that education spending
behveen 1934 and 1940 would have grown at
the same rate as it did in the years 1925 to
1933-specifically, 5.67 percent per year.

been significantly higher, S356 million.
Moreover, while the actual budget showed
surpluses in 1937 and 1938, in the absence of
Riley-Stewart there still would have been
significant deficits. Thus, while Riley-Stewart
did not eliminate the budget crisis, it did
significantly alleviate the crisis.

On the tax side, we need to project the revenues
from the gross receipts tax in the years 1936 to
1940. To make these projections, we estimate the
relationship between gross receipts tax revenue
and income for the years 1919 to 1935 and use it
to project gross receipts revenues for the next
five years?5 We obtained the best fit by
regressing the log of gross receipts revenue on
both the level and change in the log of income.
The resulting regression was:

The final counterfactual question we want to
ask is whether restrained spending throughout
the 1930s would have made Riley-Stewart
unnecessary. We can do this by comparing our
projected tax revenues in the absence of RileyStewart to the nominal spending levels that
would have existed if spending had been held
to the 1930 level in real or real per capita terms.

Log(Tax) = -4.12 + .89[Log (lncome)]1.32[Log(.D.Income)]
(2.53) (0.31)
(0.48)
Adjusted R-squared = 0.52 [standard errors in parentheses]

Both the income and change in income variables
are significant at the five percent level.
These forecasts from the regression are only
meant to be a rough estimate of the projected
gross receipts tax. None of the qualitative results
that follow depend on the precise numbers
generated by the forecast For example, adding
two standard errors of the regression to the
forecast does not alter the qualitative results. In
every year in which we project a deficit using
the regression we also obtain a deficit using the
tax series plus twice the standard error. The
actual revenue raised from the income and sales
taxes were much larger than any plausible
forecast of the gross receipts tax.
To obtain the projected tax revenues in the
absence of Riley-Stewart, we subtract actual
sales and income tax revenues from total
revenues and add our gross receipts tax
projection. General Fund balances without
Riley-Stewart and under alternative
assumptions are reported in Table 5.
From 1930 to 1940, the General Fund ran an
actual cumulative deficit of $116 million. By our
projections, in the absence of Riley-Stewart, the
cumulative deficit over this period would have

The last two columns in Table 5 report the
cumulative deficit in both of these cases. With
spending frozen at the 1930 real per capita level,
the General Fund would have run small deficits
from 1933 to 1935, but not nearly large enough
to deplete the $33 million surplus which existed
in 1930. Moreover, by the end of the decade,
the year-end surplus would have grown by
$137 million. Freezing spending at the aggregate
1930 real level would have resulted in an even
larger surplus.
The state budget crisis of the 1930s could have
been avoided by spending restraint The
depression would have caused small deficits in
the early 1930s, but the surplus that existed in
1930 was large enough to weather the crisis.
Such spending restraint would have prevented
the need for registered warrants.
Given that the Legislature did increase
spending, it is clear that the Riley-Stewart
amendment reduced the General Fund deficits.
The revenues from sales and income taxes were
larger than the loss of revenue from the gross
receipts tax and the increased spending on
education combined.
These estimates, of course, assume that
spending was largely unaffected by the passage
of Riley-Stewart It is possible that the additional
revenues from Riley-Stewart allowed spending
to grow faster than it would have otherwise
grown. This is a question of the causal relations
of taxing and spending which is quite difficult
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to address. However, to the extent that spending
was increased, the deficit-reducing impacts of
Riley-Stewart would naturally have been
reduced.

Conclusion
There are several ironies in California fiscal
history in the 1930s. First, traditional political
histories fail to recognize the radical changes
that occurred. Second, we see another instance
of the law of unintended consequences: actions
taken by voters to change the mix of taxation
allowed the government to grow rapidly in
future decades.
The conventional political history of California
takes a dim view of the achievements of the
Republican governors in the early 1930s. For
example, one historian remarked that James
Rolph Jr. was originally a Progressive but ''his
nineteen years had remade him into a typical
business-oriented Republican, and the
ceremonial functions of his office had converted
him into a glad-handling official greeter who
exuded irrepressible confidence and
optimism." 36 During his campaign for governor
in 1930, he told voters to "smile with Sunny
Jim." Although this historian looked more
favorably upon the next governor Frank
Merriam, he noted that Merriam is "usually
written off as a 'reactionary' by most historians
(mainly because he used the National Guard
against striking longshoreman in San Francisco
in 1934 and state highway patrolman against
Salinas lettuce strikers in 19 36) or as a
do-nothing conservative who caused California
to "mark time" in its struggle against the Great
Depression while the rest of the nation was
marching forward under the glorious banner of
the New Deal." 37
Instead, the typical heroes of California political
history in the 1930s were Upton Sinclair, leading
the EPIC (End Poverty in California) movement
in a failed attempt at the governorship, and

Culbert L. Olsen, the Democratic governor at
the end of the 1930s. Olsen had supported
'Sinclair and looked on his time as governor as
an opportunity to redirect politics in California.
His administration ended in failure partly
because he was "oblivious to the fact that the
national New Deal was over when he took
office in January 1939" and that Democrats
(many of whom were quite conservative) only
controlled one house of the State Legislature?8
From the vantage point of fiscal history, the
administrations of Rolph and Merriam were far
from conservative; indeed, they were radical.
This period witnessed a dramatic change in
intergovernmental relations, a sharply reduced
reliance on the property tax, and the
introduction of two potent new taxes, the sales
tax and the income tax. To be sure, Rolph and
Merriam did not act alone. They were assisted
by other state officers and members of the
Legislature. But they clearly supported major
and innovative efforts to restructure the fiscal
system.
Undoubtedly the most significant fiscal legacy
of this period was that it reduced reliance on the
property tax and led to the adoption of income
and sales taxation. Similar transformations were
taking place in 0ther states. Although it appears
that voters in California did not recognize this
at the time, their desire to reduce the property
tax burden put into place an extremely elastic
tax system, thereby permitting a rapid
expansion of government in California since the
1930s. A change in the mix of taxes led to an
increase in overall revenues. From 1929 to 1945,
assessed valuations increased in the state by
21 percent while personal income increased by
148 percent The base for the sales and income
tax expanded much more rapidly than the base
for the property tax. This provides an example
of what Higgs terms the "ratchet" effects from
fiscal crises. In this case, the ratchet arose from
fundamental changes in the tax base.
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TABLE 1
CALIFORNIA STATE EXPENDITURES AND REVENUES
DURING THE 1930s
Current Dollars
Expenditures

Revenues

General Fund

General Fund

Fiscal
Year

$ Millions

1929/30
1930/31
1931/32
1932/33
1933/34
1934/35
1935/36
1936/37
1937/38
1938/39
1939/40
1940/41

65.3
69.1
76.6
76.5
107.3
112.5
142.9
145.0
163.1
207.8
200.4
184.8

Percent Change

6.0
10.7
-0.1
40.3
4.8
27.0
1.4
12.5
27.4
-3.6
-7.8

Percent Change

$ Millions

-

65.3
69.5
59.8
50.1
83.2
110.0
127.0
159.7
177.0
170.8
178.1
200.0

6.4
-13.9
-16.3
66.1
32.2
15.4
25.8
10.8
-3.5
4.2
12.4

Constant 1982 Dollars
Expenditures

Revenues

General Fund

General Fund

Fiscal
Year

$ Millions

Percent Change

1929/30
1930/31
1931/32
1932/33
1933/34
1934/35
1935/36
1936/37
1937/38
1938/39
1939/40
1940/41

427.2
485.7
591.6
629.8
886.2
909.8
1143.1
1126.7
1245.6
1604.0
1548.8
1390.9

13.7
21.8
6.5
40.7
2.7
25.6
-1.4
10.5
28.8
-3.4
-10.2

-

5 Millions

Percent Change

427.8
488.3
462.3
412.6
687.0
889.3
1015.5
1241.5
1351.3
1318.5
1376.2
1506.3

14.1
-5.3
-10.8
66.5
29.5
14.2
22.3
8.8
-2.4
4.4
9.5

Source: Report of Assembly Interim Committee, 1947.
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TABLE 2
EXPENDITURES AND REVENUES PER $100
OF PERSONAL INCOME

Dollar Amounts Per $100 Of Personal Income
Expenditures

Revenues

Fiscal
Year

General Fund

Total

General Fund

Total

1929/30
1930/31
1931/32
1932/33
1933/34
1934/35
1935/36
1936/37
1937/38
1938/39
1939/40
1940/41

1.29
1.52
2.09
2.43
3.23
3.03
3.31
2.97
3.32
4.23
3.76
2.92

2.26
2.68
3.51
3.93
4.80
4.49
4.69
4.48
4.96
5.83
5.31
4.33

1.29
1.54
1.63
1.59
2.51
2.96
2.94
3.27
3.60
3.48
3.34
3.16

2.27
2.73
3.05
3.16
4.09
4.44
4.52
4.75
5.21
5.12
5.01
4.69

Source: Report of Assembly Interim Committee, 1947.
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TABLE 3
GROWTH RATES IN COST OF GOVERNMENT FOR MAJOR
DIVISIONS OF GOVERNMENT
(all values expressed as a percent)
Year
1925/26
1926/27
1927/28
1928/29
1929/30
1930/31
1931/32
1932/33
1933/34
1934/35
1935/36
Average:
1925/261928/29
Average:
1929/301931/32
Average:
1925/261921/32

Regulahve
9.91
17.61
3.87
13.52
10.66
91.85
2.82q
-3.19
-9.50
14.05
7.92

Construetive
24.66
0.35
7.64
76.39
12.92
5.23
13.02
-22.02
9.64
--0.52
3.47

Educational
6.98
5.58
7.55
6.55
10.41
--0.94
6.68
2.60
82.87
0.86
--0.75

Develo~-

menta
-4.34
-24.38
0.54
-25.46
-13.70
9.09
4.71
-7.25
-10.86
23.73
7.45

Protective
-3.37
--0.41
6.70
63.15
175.67
22.75
-12.04
-41.07
-42.30
25.63
7.31

Total
Benevolent Curative Corrective Penal
Cost
-18.07
9.08
8.26
0.28
9.64
7.26
20.87
5.07
36.55
-5.76
7.24
-8.87
19.74
12.10
6.72
-5.57
-3.94
44.08
6.53 17.65
17.61 12.47
49.03
10.81
-8.47
4.05
10.75
60.72
-1.53
4.11
6.48
-2.10
19.39
-10.43
6.07
-19.89 -7.59
14.31
-22.76
-18.27
-2.19
4.31
-20.58
2.59 31.08
-8.00
2.32
6.40
4.29
25.90
-4.61
18.86
769.56
46.82
5.75

11.23

27.26

6.66

-13.41

16.52

1.01

4.57

15.93

10.93

9.77

35.11

10.39

5.38

0.03

62.13

35.89

9.56

-4.95

11.61

7.55

21.46

20.03

6.12

-7.65

36.06

15.96

6.71

6.98

11.22

8.82

Budget Category
Regulative
Constructive
Educational
Developmental
Protective
Benevolent
Curative
Corrective
Penal

Share in 1929/30

Description/Example

3.08
24.47
34.01
1.76
3.91
1.16
4.98
0.89
1.78

Regulatory Boards and Commissions; Dept. of Health; Dept. of Industrial Relations
Public Works; Division of Highways; San Francisco Harbor Commission
Schools, Elementary through University
Department of Agriculture; Mining Bureau
Department of Natural Resources; Flood Control
Aid to Veterans, Orphans and Blind
Mental Health

ICorrectional Schools
Prisons; police

Source: Reports of the State Controller.
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TABLE 4
RILEY-STEWART REGRESSIONS
Dependent Variable: Percent Yes Vote

Variable

Baseline
Model

Regressions With Added Variables

Constant

.55
(.19)

.62
(.19)

.63
(.18)

.60
(.19)

.55
(.17)

Percent Vote for
Proposition 9

.32
(.14)

.23
(.15)

.30
(.15)

.34
(.15)

.32
(.15)

Average Daily
Attendance
Proportion

1.99
(.68)

1.48
(.67)

1.98
(.63)

1.88
(.67)

1.96
(.63)

Reduction in Tax
from Utility
Property

.13
(.06)

.09
(.07)

.11
(.06)

.14
(.07)

.13
(.06)

-.000013
(.000013)

Total Local
Property Rate
(All Districts)
.00027
(.00053)

County Tax Rate
1932-33

-.00029
(.00058)
0.10
(.07)

Percentage Change
in County Rate
1929-30 to 32-33
-.27
(.12)

San Francisco
Dummy
Adjusted R2

.32

.36

.32

.31

.31

Notes: Estimated by OLS over 58 counties. Heteroskedasticity corrected standard errors in

parentheses.
Source: see text for detailed descriptions of variables.
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TABLE 5
GENERAL FUND BALANCE PER YEAR UNDER DIFFERENT
ASSUMPTIONS
With Riley-Stewart Tax Changes

Without Riley-Stewart Tax Changes
No RileyStewart
expenditures

Constant real
expenditures

Constant
real per
capita
expenditures

Fiscal
Year

Actual
expenditures

Constant real
expenditures

Constant real
per capita
expenditures

1929/30
1930/31
1931/32
1932/33
1933/34
1934/35
1935/36
1936/37
1937/38
1938/39
1939/40
Cumulative:
1929/40

96
371
-16733
-26383
-24128
-2533
-15951
14763
13846
-36986
-22338

96
8954
4817
-1495
31603
57116
73651
104705
121083
115373
123045

96
7007
1739
-3979
28083
53359
68879
96673
110605
104306
110871

96
371
-16733
-26383
-24096
-27636
-40240
-20475
-36938
-86335
-77776

96
8954
4817
-1495
-1635
644
21317
42774
42902
38328
41350

96
7007
1739
-3979
-5155
-3113
16545
34742
32424
27261
29176

-115976

638947

577639

-356145

198051

136743

Notes: All numbers are in thousands of dollars.
Source: Authors' calculations (see text) and Report of the Assembly Committee on State and Local
Taxation, 1947.
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K-12 EDUCATION
by Amanda Meeker

Overview of the History of Constitutional Provisions
Dealing with K-12 Education
Education has been a vital interest of the state
government in California since the state drafted
its first constitution. Through the years, as the
culture has changed and politics have shifted,
ideas about the state's role in education also
have evolved. Over time, there has been an
increasing belief in the importance of education.
As the culture has become more sophisticated,
the state has been called upon to provide an
ever-widening array of educational
opportunities for California's students. Where
only an elementary education was once
necessary, now Californians see a need for a
strong state-provided university education.
Another gradual trend, with a few minor
setbacks, has been toward increasing local
control over education. Where the Legislature
once controlled everything from the
organization of schools to choosing textbooks,
now local districts have much greater authority. 1
The 1849 Constitution provided that the
Legislature should "encourage by all suitable
means the promotion of intellectual, scientific,
moral, and agricultural improvements," and
should maintain a system of free common
schools to be kept open at least three months
out of every year. It also specified various
sources of money, such as revenues from lands
granted by Congress, that were to be set aside
as a permanent school fund. The article on
education was similar to that of the Iowa
Constitution.
Though the education article was not lengthy,
the subject was important to the framers at
Monterey. They agreed that education was
crucial to the future of the state, and that a free
education (for the lower grades) was necessary.
Not surprisingly, California's school system was
poor in 1849, and those families that did have

children with them often had to send their
children to the States, Chile, or Peru to be
properly educated? By 1850 the new state's
educational system had been founded: one
public school in Sonoma, with thirty-seven
students, and another in Santa Barbara, with
twelve?
It was initially suggested that the Legislature
should be allowed to appropriate monies out of
portions of the school fund for other purposes
as it saw fit. Some worried that the school lands,
out of whose rents money was to come for the
schools, might be located in the mining districts,
in which case the "funds derived from them
might rise to such an enormous amount that it
might be doing the other parts of the State an
injustice to appropriate all this revenue to
school purposes." 4 The proviso was voted
down, however, by a 31 to 5 margin by those
who believed it was important that the money
be inviolably set aside for education. They
pointed out that "nothing will have a greater
tendency to secure prosperity for our state ...
than by providing for the education of our
posterity" and that no amount of money could
ever "secure too great a spread of knowledge." 5
There were practical arguments too. The framers
generally agreed that California would benefit
from further immigration. For the state to
prosper, it needed people to come who would
stay, not just dig gold and then return home to
their families. 6 A liberal school fund, one man
pointed out, would be "an inducement to a
most valuable class of the population to come
here-families having children." 7 Another
encouraged the bachelors present to vote in
favor of a liberal school fund as a means of
attracting families with potentially marriageable
daughters to California. 8
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The article on education stood the test of time
better than some of the other articles, but still
the revised Constitution of 1879 did make some
changes to it. Like the framers of the original
Constitution, the 1879 delegates thought
education was a cornerstone of their state, and
their changes were aimed at securing
education's prominent place. 9 One delegate
summed up the general attitude of the
convention: "it is a right that every child
possesses, to be educated freely by the
government." 10 The new constitution increased
the number of months the schools were to
remain in session from three months to six and
added a preliminary sentence, taken from the
constitution of Missouri, to the article,
emphasizing the importance of education. 11
There was some argument on including the
phrase, as some felt that a statement of principle
had no place in a constitution. Among those
who disagreed, one argued that it would
provide the answer if anyone should question
why the state furnished free educationY
Despite their commitment to education, many of
the delegates felt strongly that an elementary
school education was all that was necessary.
This attitude was evident in the section on the
state school fund, which was retained from the
1849 constitution. Although the new
constitution provided that the public school
system could include high schools, technical
schools, and teacher training schools, it also
specified that all revenue from the school fund
was to go exclusively to the grammar and
primary schools. 13 While some argued that
districts ought to be allowed to set up any kind
of school they desired, the majority believed
that funds should be guaranteed to educate
children only in the lower grades. 14 As one
delegate explained, "if it is desired to educate
beyond that point, I hold that it is the privilege
of every parent to educate their children up as
high as they choose . . . but I deny that the
State owes that kind of education to the
children." 15 The prevailing sentiment was:
"every child in the State shall receive the
benefits of a common school education-no
more and no less." 16
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The general attitude at the 1879 convention was
one of distrust of the state government.
Throughout the convention, the delegates
sought to put strictures on the Legislature,
making certain to specify various acts that
should be forbidden. In that vein, the delegates
agreed without debate that no religious doctrine
could be taught in any public school. 17
Considerable discussion of prohibiting the
teaching of foreign languages in the public
schools was a feature of the debates, but no
such provision was ultimately included. The
delegates also gave local governments
considerably more control over the schools in
their districts than they had enjoyed
previously. 18 The prevailing opinion was
expressed by the delegate who proclaimed his
hope that all "amendments tending to centralize
power will be voted down." 19 In keeping with
that perspective, the new constitution gave the
local boards of education, or boards of
supervisors where there were no boards of
education, the responsibility to choose textbooks
for their district schools and to examine teachers
and grant teachers' certificates, privileges
formerly of the Legislature?0 By these actions,
the delegates hoped to avoid the "corrupting
influence attached to the private competition
and speculation of the present system." 21
Some were concerned that the relaxation of
centralized authority would lead to standards
being lowered in counties that lacked enough
teachers?2 However, worries about the lack of
uniformity that their restructuring might entail
were generally put aside. One delegate voiced
quite the reverse sentiment, asking, "How can
you allow every one to develop their natural
faculties if the study has to be equal and
uniform for all?" 23
Giving local authorities the power to choose the
textbooks evidently did not work very well.
During the late nineteenth century, there were
many more school districts than there are today,
with many of them being one-room schools.
Teachers were not well trained and, as a
dissenter at the 1879 convention had pointed
out, many of the county supervisors, "selected
with reference to their competency to deal with
county roads and such subjects, are not the best
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men to deal with the schools." 24 As a result, an
1884 constitutional amendment put the decision
back at the state level, this time with a new
State Board of Education, a body that several
delegates had advocated in 1879.Z5 The board
was to consist of the governor, the
superintendent of schools, and the principals of
the state normal schools. The State Printing
Office would produce the textbooks and sell
them at cost to the students, a measure that also
had been suggested at the 1879 convention on
the grounds that it would "forever put an end
to the disgraceful squabble between rival book
houses and the corrupting influence growing
therefrom." 26 Teachers' examinations and
certificates were left with the local boards.
No important amendment to this section
occurred until 1912, when it was specified that
the State Board of Education should be elected
and that textbooks for elementary schools
should be provided by the state at no charge.
The proponents of free textbooks argued that
textbooks were the most necessary of supplies
to the students and should be free, thus making
the public schools "free in fact as well as
name." 27 They also suggested that it would
"remove the last excuse of selfish parents not to
send their children to school." 28
As schools improved and a good education
became increasingly important in California
society, a slow trend in constitutional
amendments began toward supporting wider
levels of education. A 1902 amendment
authorized the Legislature to provide for a
special tax to support high schools and technical
schools. A 1920 amendment added
kindergartens to the definition of the school
system. It also specified teacher salaries and
mandated that the Legislature provide at least
$30 per student into the State School Fund and
that it create a State High School Fund with the
same amount of money per pupil. 29 World War
I inflation had made teachers' salaries less than
adequate, while the war boom had brought new
jobs to California. As a result, in 1920 there were
more than 600 schools in the state that lacked
teachers, mostly in the rural areas. The goal of
the amendment was to "provide a more definite

and adequate support for public schools," and
thereby prevent families who could not find
suitable instruction for their children in the rural
districts from moving off their farms, which
might then fall into disuse or be taken over "by
Japanese and other Orientals." 30 By mandating
the level of state contribution, the proponents
argued, thE: amendment also halted a trend in
which the state was shifting the economic
burden of the schools onto the counties. 31 In
1946 the state school system was again revised,
this time to include colleges, the amount to be
provided in the School Fund was raised to
$120 per student in kindergarten through the
college level, and teacher salaries were again
raised. War was again partially responsible for
the amendment. Immigration to California
during World War II was extremely brisk and
birthrates also were rising. Retired teachers were
re-enlisted, new teachers were recruited by
lowering the credential standards, and others
taught two separate shifts of students each day.
As the amendment's proponents said,
"California's public school system is confronted
with the most serious crisis in its history." 32
They sought to resolve it by increasing funding.
In 1952 the amount was again raised, this time
to $180. In 1964 another change was made, this
time a deletion of the section that had been in
the constitution since its beginnings in 1849
regarding sources of school revenue. Most of the
5.5 million acres granted by Congress in 1853
had long since been sold, so the provision that
their revenues should go into the school fund
was obsolete. According to the argument in
favor of deleting the provision, the move would
not reduce funding for schools, but would
merely eliminate "unnecessary accounting
procedures." 33
Such constant revisions of specifics made it clear
to the 1960s Constitution Revision Commission
that the article on education needed to be pared
down to basic law. As one report to the
commission concluded, "Article 9 contains
much legislative detail" and much that is
"outmoded and thus obsolete or
meaningless." 34 Accordingly, the commission
recommended deleting mention of grade levels,
specific amounts to be provided to the school
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fund, and teachers' salaries. The redrafted
article was substantially shorter than it had
been, but these three recommendations were not
acted upon.
True to the ever-expanding interest in higher
education, much of the revision commission's
debate centered on the colleges and universities.
Nevertheless, the commission did take up
various aspects of the article that centered on
elementary and high school issues. One major
topic of discussion, which never emerged from
the discussion phase, was whether state funds
should be provided for students who attended
private schools. The ongoing debate over who
should choose textbooks was renewed during
the revision commission's work. Local control
had again become a rallying cry, with argument
that in a diverse state such as California, local
agencies knew best what was desirable for the
local children?5 The proponents of local choice
argued, "the best textbook for a gifted child in
Beverly Hills may not suit a rural child in

Page 82- K-12 Education

Coachella with an English language
handicap." 36 A report to the commission
pointed out that school districts were becoming
increasingly sophisticated and capable of
making wise choices for the schools. 37 On the
other side, proponents of uniformity cited the
advantage to a mobile population if a child
could switch districts and still have the same
texts?8
Most of the revision commission's
recommendations were accepted. In 1970, the
voters approved providing free textbooks for
students in grades one through eight. A 1976
amendment permitted two or more county
boards of education to merge to share
responsibilities. Additionally, local voters
received the right to choose whether their
county superintendents of education should be
elected or appointed. The county board of
education was given the power to determine the
county superintendent's salary.
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LOCAL GOVERNMENT
by Amanda Meeker

An Overview of the History of Constitutional
Provisions Dealing with Local Government
The 1849 Constitution gave the legislature
considerable power over local government
making it responsible for providing a uniform
system of county and town governments. The
Legislature, not the local authorities, had the
power to incorporate cities and could restrict
their power to tax, assess, borrow, and loan,
provisions borrowed from the constitution of
New York. 1 The Legislature could provide for
the election of county boards of supervisors,
though all county officers were to be supported
by their respective counties, a provision taken
from the constitution of Wisconsin. The framers
thought it more likely that the local
governments might oppress the people than that
the Legislature would do so?
When the framers decided that the Legislature
should never create corporations by special act,
they added, "except for political or municipal
purposes." Although there was considerable
argument over this section, no one questioned
the advisability of putting the power to create
town governments in the hands of the
Legislature. 3 Again, there was precedent for
their decision; the section had been taken nearly
literally from the constitution of New York. 4
It was not long before various provisions in the

new state's constitution began drawing
criticism. The state was changing rapidly, and
the constitution had been framed for another
era. People began calling for a revision of the
document as early as 1857. 5 In 1877 the voters
approved a measure providing for a new
Constitutional Convention, which was held in
1879. The Workingmen's Party, formed in 1877
in San Francisco, played an important role in
the convention preliminaries, and took 51 of the

152 seats at the convention, carrying San
Francisco, Los Angeles, and Nevada City. 6
Though there was a general anti-legislature
sentiment at the convention, the Workingmen's
delegates were perhaps the most adamantly
opposed to centralized government. As the
Workingmen, led by Dennis Kearney, had been
holding their riotous anti-Chinese, anti-wealth
meetings in the sand lots of San Francisco, the
Legislature had been passing special legislation
to, among other things, increase San Francisco's
police force and to appropriate $20,000 in the
interests of the city's public peace? At the
convention, although the Workingmen made
several proposals that garnered little
enthusiasm, such as having a unicameral
legislature and abolishing the office of
lieutenant governor, their opposition to
centralized power did find broad support
among the delegates. 8
The 1849 Constitution's provisions for local
government earned considerable criticism.
Many delegates at the 1879 convention spoke
strongly against special legislation, by which
they primarily meant laws affecting singular
matters on the local level. As one delegate put
it, "there is nothing in the whole state that is
more demanded" than "to cut off special
legislation." 9 The legislature had been giving
considerable time to deciding local matters, to
the neglect of more important statewide affairs.
According to one delegate, matters "of vast
importance to the state" were pushed aside
until the end of the session "and then passed, if
at all, without any consideration." 10 In the most
recent session, in fact, the legislature had passed
572 laws, of which 503 were speciallegislation.U
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Additionally, many people felt that the
Legislature really had no sense of what was
necessary on the local level, and should leave
those matters to the people who lived there and
did know what their communities needed. As
one delegate argued, "special bills were passed
often ... without any member of the legislature
knowing anything about them except the
member who introduced them." 12 Not only was
special legislation, in their eyes, "detrimental to
the interests of counties and townships," but it
also was "one of the greatest sources of
corruption ... in our legislative halls." 13 As a
result, the new constitution included a
prohibition against special legislation in
thirty-three specific instances and in any other
case in which a general law would apply. 14 The
provision was "designed to reduce [the
legislature's] labors, so they will be confined
almost entirely to the perfecting of the codes; to
[stop it from] frittering away the people's
money; to prevent jobbery, and to blot out of
existence the lobby; and to reduce the
Legislature to something like a fundamental
body." 15 It was pointed out that "all the more
recent Constitutions" were including similar
provisions. 16
Henceforth, the legislature was to provide only
by general laws for the incorporation of cities
and towns. 17 A delegate from San Francisco
explained that they hoped that this would "cut
off the log-rolling around the Legislature by
men who are scheming for the offices. One man
wants to be County Judge, another Sheriff....
In former times the legislative power was
unrestricted. But since then it has been found
necessary to place restrictions upon the
Legislature. It is the policy now to give the
people more direct control, and take away from
the Legislature the power to pass special
laws." 18 Cities and towns were subject only to
general laws.
San Francisco came away from the convention
with new powers of self government. Cities
with populations over 100,000 (which included
at the time only San Francisco) were permitted
to frame charters for their own government. The
provisions of the charter would supersede all
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special laws that were inconsistent with it. 19
San Francisco was singled out because it was a
unique entity. No other town even approached
it in population. As one delegate explained,
general laws could not "be broad enough to
cover the interests of the people of San
Francisco." Additionally, of course, the city
vociferously called for rights of self-government.
There was a large contingent of delegates from
San Francisco, one of whom demanded
indignantly, "What reason have these gentlemen
to give why we should not manage our own
affairs?" 20 The provision for San Francisco
mimicked Missouri's provision for St. Louis. In
deference to fears that a city might adopt an
"injudicious" charter, and that they were
making San Francisco into "an independent
sovereignty ... entirely outside of the control
and jurisdiction of the Legislature," however,
the constitution did provide that the Legislature
would have to approve the charter before it
could take effect. 21 Interestingly enough, the
provisions favoring San Francisco were not
enough to win its support; in the election, the
city did not provide a majority vote for the new
constitution, possibly because merchants,
businessmen, and corporations, of which there
were many in the city, generally opposed it. 22
While San Francisco and other cities that might
grow to have populations over 100,000 were
granted a notable increase in power, the
counties did not receive equal rights. Unlike
San Francisco, the counties were relatively
lightly populated and were not well-organized.
Many contained no incorporated cities and were
composed largely of undeveloped land?3 No
one at the convention was vocal in demanding
rights for counties, so the issue was not
discussed. The local government article
recognized them as "subdivisions of this state,"
which has been restrictively construed to mean
that they are nothing more than subsidiaries of
the state?4 Additionally, it was the legislature's
prerogative to establish a uniform system of
county governments and to determine the
duties and terms of office of county officials?5
While it was suggested that the counties should
determine the duties of their officers, that
proposal was rejected. In opposition to the
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suggestion, one delegate complained, "the
Legislature has been so entirely shorn of its
power, that it's almost a useless
organization." 26 In theory, the requirement that
the rules be uniform would prevent any special
legislation. To avoid any necessity for special
legislation, the legislature was permitted to
classify the counties by population in order to
fix the salaries of the county officials?7 Putting
salaries in the hands of the Legislature was
partly due to the fear that if wages were left
with the local boards, those boards might very
well "so reduce the pay that these officers
cannot afford to hold the office." 28 Recent
financial troubles of one county had brought it
to the point where "if they could have done it,
they would not have had a single officer in the
county." 29 Nevertheless, there were some
objections to putting such broad powers into the
hands of the legislature. A delegate pointed out
that the counties had frequently petitioned to be
able to form their own townships, and that
"local matters should be determined by local
officers." 30

This stipulation was intended to prevent the
state of affairs in which, as one delegate put it,
"the county seats have been almost on
wheels." 37 As a later report has pointed out,
moving county seats was an important issue,
since in the nineteenth century the location of a
county seat was critical to economic
development.

Despite giving these powers to the legislature,
the perception remained that "the object of the
people in having this convention called ... was
to have as much of the local legislation taken
away from the Legislature as possible, and
given to the different counties and cities." 31 To
address this object, the counties were granted
the power to make and enforce all laws "not in
conflict" with general state laws. 32 Local laws
could, however, be found in conflict with
general laws for various reasons, including if
they duplicated state laws in any way, making
the grant of power a little less permissive than it
appeared. 33 Similar limited home rule
provisions had been common in charters that
had previously been granted in California, and
appeared in the 1875 constitution of Missouri. 34
An additional restriction prohibited the
legislature from imposing taxes for local
purposes. 35

Another provision was that no new county
could be created if it had less than 5,000 people
or if its creation caused another county to have
less than 8,000 people. 38 Though there was some
argument that the provision would in essence
prevent any new counties from forming, the
object was to prevent indiscriminate creation of
new counties, in which "Carpetbaggers go to
work and create a new county in order to place
themselves in positions." 39 As a delegate
explained the purpose of the prohibition, it was
intended to "put the brakes on the very bad
practice of dividing up counties for the purpose
of making some gentleman's farm valuable, or
affording places and positions for hungry
politicians." 40 Another pointed out that the
habit of forming new counties whenever a
mining excitement occurred had been "a great
detriment to the State." 41 Significant problems
with the formation of new counties had in fact
occurred. In 1874, for example, Klamath County
was dissolved, having been so reduced by
annexations to neighboring counties that,
according to one report, "little remained ...
except a mountainous area and an almost
unpayable debt." 42 It was also pointed out that
the new constitution should embrace current
political thought on the issue of local versus
state control so that it would not "be behind the
age." 43 An opposing view that there were
counties so large that a man might have to
travel 100 miles to the county seat, and the
county ought to be able to be divided whether
or not it had 5,000 residents, did not sway the
majority in their quest to rein in the
Legislature.44

Several other provisions regarding counties
restricted legislative power. For example, county
seats were not to be moved except by a
two-thirds vote of the people in the county?6

The constitution had, of course, not pleased
everyone, and amendments followed soon after
its adoption. Most headed in the direction of
increased powers for local governments. Not
Local
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surprisingly, other cities sought the same
advantages given to San Francisco, and in 1887
the ability to frame a charter was granted to
cities of 10,000 or more. Still smaller towns then
wanted the same rights, and in 1890 the
provisions were extended to include cities of
3,500 or more. Additionally, the charters were
now to supersede all laws inconsistent with
them, not just all "special laws." As the number
of chartered cities grew, so too did questions
regarding their status in relation to state
government. An 1896 amendment provided that
cities and towns were subject to general laws
except in municipal affairs, a more liberal grant
of power than had been in the section as
originally adopted. A 1914 amendment placed
the cities even farther from the reach of general
laws by providing that chartered cities and
towns could "make and enforce all laws and
regulations in respect to municipal affairs,
subject only to the restrictions and limitations
provided in their several charters." 45
In 1911 an amendment allowed chartered cities
to establish borough systems of government, in
which districts could be granted special
municipal powers. 46 A 1914 amendment
specified that chartered cities might make and
enforce all municipal laws and regulations,
subject only to restrictions in their charters,
though they were subject to general laws "in all
other matters." 47 In 1922 it was provided that
no city could be annexed to any other
municipality unless a majority of its voters
agreed. 48
In the stipulations about forming new counties,
increasing population soon outdated the
numbers specified in the 1879 constitution. A
1910 amendment provided that the number of
residents in a new county could not be less than
8,000 and no county could be reduced to a
population of less than 20,000. 49 The
amendment came partly in response to a recent
supreme court decision that had held that a
special law making a county line change was
constitutional. 50 The amendment's purpose was
to "make it more difficult to organize new
counties within the state." Several new counties
had been created over the last twenty years, and
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the amendment's proponents argued that
"sometimes the new county is promoted largely
as a real estate venture by residents of a locality
that is ambitious to become a county seat." The
amendment, they said, would "put a stop to
efforts to cut the state up into small and
impecunious political subdivisions." 51 In that
statement they were correct; no new counties
were formed after Imperial in 1907. 52
In a reflection of the trend toward more powers
for the cities, counties also began gaining more
autonomy. In 1911 counties were finally given
the right to adopt charters for their
organization. 53 In part, this addressed problems
that had persisted since before 1879. Chief
among these was that legislators were passing
laws affecting counties about which they knew
nothing. According to one witness, "By a time
honored custom of courtesy the framing of the
county bills is left to the member or members
from each county without inquiry." 54 The
proponents of county charters saw the measure
as a "logical growth from the successful
administration of 'charter cities'." They pointed
out that although the delegates in 1879 had
believed that the "uniform system" of county
government would be "impregnable to the
assault of those demanding special laws," such
was not the case. The legislature had used the
permission to classify counties to "put each
county in a class by itself," thus evading the
prohibition against special legislation while
achieving the same effect. The amendment's
backers believed that "if the people had a voice
in their county government ... special favors
and political 'plums' ... would not be parceled
out." 55 The move was in accord with the new
progressive politics in California. Those in favor
of the amendment believed that the citizens,
newly armed with the initiative, referendum,
and recall, could and should actively shape their
county government.
Amendments in 1933 further strengthened home
rule. The provision that the legislature was to
establish a uniform system of county
governments (Sec. 4) was repealed. Additionally,
the county boards of supervisors were given the
power to determine the salaries of all county
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officers other than themselves and the district
attorneys and auditors. The intention was to
"bring flexibility, efficiency, and economy to
county government" while also bringing "the
matter closer home." 56
With such constant revisions having added
greatly to the length and complexity of the local
government article, when the constitution
revision commission began its work in the 1960s
it found plenty to change. Even without the
amendments, the article had been unwieldy,
since in their attempt to check the power of the
legislature, the delegates to the constitutional
convention of 1879 had loaded the article with
prohibitions and specifications. As the revision
commission pointed out, the local government
article was longer than the entire United States
Constitution, full of obsolete provisions, and
laden with detail that properly belonged in
statutory law. 5 7 The rewritten article, approved
by the voters in 1970, pared the article down
from 22,000 words to 6,000. 58 Most of the
excisions dealt with procedure, such as the steps
to frame a charter, or detail, such as the specific
instances in which special legislation was
forbidden. As a report to the commission noted,
such "minute particularization" on these topics
"perhaps reflects a somewhat anachronistic
distrust of the state legislature." 59 While
keeping most of the overall meaning intact, the
new article did make some changes, mostly in
the direction of granting more power to county
governments.
The role of counties had changed considerably
since the constitution was adopted. A report to
the commission noted, "the power now
exercised by county governments goes well
beyond the original conception of the county as
a local entity administering state functions. A
modern urban county ... can't be accurately
called a mere 'legal subdivision of the state'." 60
As the population of the state increased,
especially after 1940, and the trend toward
suburbanization began, the counties began to
shoulder responsibilities formerly in the hands
of city governments. Such duties as water
conservation, flood control, health services, and
library services, once in the realm of the

municipal government, became necessary in the
counties as well.61 An author as early as 1947
pointed out that "today county government in
California operates neither exclusively as an
instrumentality of the state nor as a unit of local
self-government. It is in transition with its
future course to a certain extent uncharted." 62
Recognizing counties' increasingly irr.portant
functions, the new article strengthened local
government and allowed it greater flexibility. 63
For example, it allowed counties, instead of the
legislature, to fix the salaries of district attorneys
and county auditors, allowed counties to
establish new departments without legislative
approval, and required voter approval for a new
county to be formed or for counties to be
consolidated. It also made many of the article's
provisions applicable to both cities and
counties. 64 City government was also
strengthened; the revised article allowed all
cities, not just those with populations greater
than 3,500, to adopt charters and allowed a
majority vote, instead of a two thirds vote, to
repeal a charter.
Local powers were further strengthened after
the June 1970 overhaul. An amendment to the
new article came only a few months later, at the
November 1970 general election. County
governments, instead of the legislature, were
given the power to determine the salaries of
their members, subject to referendum. The
proponents of the amendment emphasized the
importance of "home rule," pointing out that
without the amendment, "salaries are borne by
local taxpayers, yet state legislators tell you how
much you should be taxed." 65 In 1974 an
amendment allowed cities and counties to
adopt, amend, or repeal their charters by a
majority vote without legislative approval. The
goal was pragmatic: to eliminate the need for
the legislature to spend time approving charters,
none of which had been rejected in the years
since the provision had been included in the
1879 constitution, and to save the costs of
printing the bills approving the charter actions.
Another amendment, approved at the next
election, allowed county school superintendents
to be either elected or appointed, gave the right
to determine their salaries to the county boards
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of education instead of the legislature, and
allowed counties to establish joint boards of
education. Such changes might have pleased the
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constitution's framer who said, "You cannot
bring government any too near to the
people." 66
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Creatures of Statute . . . Children of Trade:
The Legal Origins of California Cities
by Peter M. Detwiler 1
The current tensions between the California
Legislature and municipal leaders over taxation,
special legislation, home rule, and the two
groups' respective roles is nothing new. From
the first days of the Legislature in December
1849 to the present, legislators and city officials
have argued over these issues. Remarkably, the
range of topics remains the same. This brief
review traces the statutory beginnings of
California cities to explain the long-standing
differences between the Legislature and cities.
A legacy of legislative interference. Mistrust
and meddling marked the California
Legislature's relationship with its cities and
towns during the first 30 years of statehood. The
California Constitution of 1849 permitted a
series of abuses that grew worse until the
principle of home rule entered the Constitution
of 1879. To understand how the need for
municipal home rule came about, one must first
understand the cities' difficult beginnings?
Local rule before statehood. When California
joined the Union in 1850, it had to transform the
institutional remnants of Mexican rule and the
de facto city governments of the Argonauts into a
regular system of local government. The
alcalde - an office that combined the powers of
mayor, magistrate, and sheriff- dominated
Mexican institutions. The Rev. Walter Colton
was Monterey's alcalde, with substantial
authority over not only the town, but also for
300 miles around. The Yankee notions of
separation of powers and constitutionallydelegated power were not evident in a system
that relied on personal rule and few written
statutes. As more Americans entered California,
they characterized the alcaldes as capricious and
instead installed the public values of their home
states. 3
As California's population exploded from 10,000
in 1846 to 92,500 in 1850, it exacerbated the
problems of a society without legitimate civil

government. American immigrants became
increasingly dissatisfied with the Mexican
institutions they inherited and with the failure
of a succession of military governors to create a
system of civilian government. Commodore
Stockton, the second military governor, ordered
existing local governments to continue in office. 4
Although Stockton prepared a plan for a
territorial government, including the annual
election of local officials, he never set it in
motion. 5 Miners' districts organized themselves
in eclectic blends of remembered civil law and
often violent frontier justice. "In brief the new
mining camp was a little republic," wrote Josiah
Royce, "Practically independent for a time of
the regular state officials." 6 In the absence of
formal civil government, residents of San
Francisco and other communities simply
ignored the military authorities and created
their own local institutions. During this
"No-Government period," San Francisco elected
a 15-member Legislative Assembly which
General Bennet Riley declared illegal in June
1849 when he called for the first constitutional
convention?
The race to be first. Several of the existing
settlements attempted to legitimize their civic
institutions when the Legislature met in
December 1849. These local governments were
ad hoc arrangements like Sacramento's, or the
inheritors of pueblo government as in Los
Angeles and San Jose. Sacramento residents had
adopted their own charter on October 13, 1849. 8
Los Angeles residents claimed that Mexican law
had conferred charter status on them. 9
Sacramento's was the first attempt and a close
examination of its pursuit of cityhood explains
the way that California's first municipalities
dealt with the Legislature. Assemblyman P. B.
Cornwall broached the subject on December 20,
1849, by announcing that he intended to
introduce a bill before Christmas to incorporate
Local Government - Page 97

---------------------------------~
a City of Sacramento. The next day, in the first
"State-of-the-State" message, Governor Peter H.
Burnett charged the Legislature with the issues
he thought needed resolution, including the
adoption of a "comprehensive system" for
providing city government. 10 Governor Burnett
noted the Legislature's responsibility under the
California Constitution. 11 California's first
governor had a strong interest in
intergovernmental relations.
Cornwall duly introduced his bill for
Sacramento's incorporation on Christmas Eve,
and on December 28 introduced a citizens'
petition for incorporation. A second petition
arrived New Year's EveY The Assembly
Committee on Corporations considered all three
proposals and rapidly reported back on January
9, 1850. The Committee recommended two bills:
a specific incorporation bill for Sacramento and
a bill creating a uniform procedure for
incorporating cities and villages. Although it
recognized the "evils" of special incorporation
bills, the Committee said that a separate act was
justified in Sacramento's case because the
uniform procedure for forming a "small inland
village" did not fit the needs of "a large
commercial sea-port town." The Committee
concluded that the uniform bill would mean
that very few special acts would be neededY
The Assembly Committee's argument against
special incorporation acts must not have
persuaded everyone because Senator Alexander
W. Hope introduced a special bill for Los
Angeles on January 14. 14 The fate of Hope's bill
for Los Angeles became closely linked with
Cornwall's Sacramento bill which the Assembly
tabled the next dayY Further amendments
resulted in the Assembly approving the
Sacramento bill unanimously on January 21. 16 In
what appears to have been a race to incorporate
the first city, the Senate approved the Los
Angeles bill on January 24, sent it to the
Assembly which considered it, amended it,
suspended the deadline rules, and passed it.
The Senate reciprocated by passing the
Sacramento bill, all on the same dayY
Curiously, the rapid tandem progress of the two
special incorporation bills slowed down with
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the Los Angles bill reaching Governor Burnett
on February 1, but the Sacramento bill not until
February 11.18 This delay, however, actually
helped Sacramento's cause.
Governor Burnett vetoed the Los Angeles
special incorporation bill on February 8 with
two main objections: expediency and
constitutionality. 19 The Governor's lengthy veto
message noted the experience of other states
where special acts produced "great and serious
evils." Comparison of special incorporation acts
shows, Burnett argued, that they "are the same
in substance" and the repetition just raises
legislative costs as members must either waste
time studying each one, or vote "at random and
thus permit abuses to creep in." Instead, Burnett
wanted a "comprehensive Act" to save "time,
labor, and expenses, and in the end be far more
beneficial and understood."
Not content merely to exhort, the Governor
outlined his own recommendations for a
uniform procedure. Such a law, Burnett wrote,
should distinguish between villages and cities
and that cities would have "to contain a given
population." The notion of a minimum
population for incorporation would persist in
state laws until 1977?0 Noting that
incorporation attempts would arise when the
Legislature was not meeting, Governor Burnett
suggested that the Legislature delegate the
review of incorporations to the County Courts.
This move would not be a delegation of the
legislative power over incorporation to the
judiciary, he claimed, because a Court would
only check the size of the population; an
investigation, not a legislative act.
Six years later, when the issue reached the
California Supreme Court, the justices swiftly
rejected Burnett's reasoning. 21 Burnett's veto
message went on to recommend two classes of
municipalities based on location: "cities upon
navigable waters" and "cities inland," because
they needed different powers. There was no
reason to give all cities the same powers, he
said, because some of "those powers would
simply remain dormant." If a specific need
arose, "a short special act could be passed for
that additional purpose."
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Burnett's second objection to the Los Angeles
special incorporation bill was the limited power
to taxation that it conferred on municipal
officials. Referring to Article IV, Section 3 of the
1849 Constitution, the Governor argued that
only the Legislature had the power to tax and
that the bill's requirement for a majority of
voters to approve a city tax rate failed to protect
minority rights. He also worried that the power
to widen city streets without compensation to
property owners was confiscation. In closing,
Burnett said that he vetoed the Los Angeles bill
only because of his objection to unlimited
taxation, and would not have vetoed it
otherwise.
The Senate was apparently unimpressed with
Burnett's reasons because five days later it
overrode his veto by a vote of 11 to 0. 22 The
Assembly failed to gain the two-thirds vote
needed to override the veto. On February 14 the
vote was 14 to 11, and the next day it was 16 to
12.23
Following the success of his veto of the Los
Angeles bill, Governor Burnett also vetoed the
Sacramento incorporation bill on February 21
with a veto message that was nearly identical to
the first. 24 The significant difference was the
addition of a new constitutional argument. The
Governor cited Article IV, Section 31 of the 1849
Constitution which permitted special act
municipal incorporations and reached three
conclusions: (1) a municipal corporation is the
only type of corporation that the Legislature
could create by special act; (2) only municipal
corporations and not private corporations may
levy taxes; and, (3) the Legislature must restrict
municipal corporations' tax powers because no
one else can. Despite the Governor's additional
concerns, on February 26 the Assembly
overrode the veto by a vote of 16 to 5, as did the
Senate on a 9 to 2 vote.25 Sacramento became
California's first incorporated city.26
Uniform laws. The Legislature took Governor
Burnett's advice seriously, however, and
proceeded to pass two uniform laws: one for
cities, the other for towns. The Cities Act
required new cities to have a minimum of 2,000
residents and limited their area to four square

miles. The Act described two procedures for
incorporation: the Legislature could create new
cities, or residents could petition the County
Court. The inclusion of both methods
represented a compromise between
incorporation by special act and the Governor's
recommendation for Court participation.
Regardless of their initiation, all new cities
would be governed according to the uniform
powers in the Act. The new law gave
communities some latitude regarding the size of
their Common Council which could have as few
as seven or as many as 20 members. The
Governor's objection to unlimited taxing power
was countered by restricting cities' property
taxes to 2% of assessed valuation.27 The
historical irony is discovering one of local
government's earliest controversies re-enacted
130 years later in 1978 when Proposition 13
limited all local property taxes to 1% of assessed
val ua tion.2 8
Communities immediately took advantage of
the new uniform law and the Legislature
created three new cities under the Act: Sonoma
and Los Angeles on April 4 and Santa Barbara
on April 9. 29 But even after the uniform Act's
adoption, the Legislature passed special
incorporation acts for Beneda, San Diego, San
Jose, Monterey, and San Francisco. 30 Governor
Burnett did not veto these special acts probably
because many of them included the restrictions
that he called for in his earlier veto messages.
The San Diego and San Jose bills, for example,
limited property taxes to 1% of assessed value, a
restriction tougher than the limit in the uniform
law.
The Towns Act was similar to the uniform law
for cities in many respects. A town required at
least 200 inhabitants and could cover up to three
square miles. A petition to incorporate could be
presented to the County Court.or to the
Governor if the Court had yet to be organized.
The local governing body was a five-member
Board of Trustees. The law limited a town's
taxing authority to one-half percent of assessed
value. 31 In 1855, the Legislature raised this limit
to 1% and, reflecting the needs of the times,
allowed towns to regulate bars, levy a $6 annual
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tax on dogs, and elect a town recorder to judge
infractions of local ordinances. 32
In 1856, the California Supreme Court declared
the Towns Act unconstitutionat dismantling the
compromise that Governor Burnett had built
with the Legislature. The Court held that the
Legislature improperly delegated the power to
incorporate towns to the County Courts;
impermissible because the courts are not part of
the legislative branch. The Supreme Court
instead suggested that the Legislature delegate
this legislative responsibility to the county
board of supervisors or some other body with
similar powers?3 First reprimanded by
Governor Burnett in 1850 for passing special
acts, the Legislature took his advice and
assigned the duty to the County Courts, only to
be rebuked by the Supreme Court in 1856 for
improperly delegating a legislative
responsibility. In response, the Legislature
repealed the 1850 statute and adopted a new
Towns Act. Virtually identical to its predecessor,
the 1856 version delegated the incorporation
power to county boards of supervisors. 34 The
essence of this arrangement persists?5
Legislative interference. After the Legislature
settled the early controversies of how to form
cities, it succumbed to pressures by economic
interests and enacted special legislation for
cities. Neither the 1849 Constitution nor case
law from other states precluded the Legislature
from meddling in local affairs. Four cases
exemplify the Legislature's abuses in this
period. They also explain why the 1879
Constitution curbed those practices and how
subsequent legislation evolved into the home
rule doctrine. 36
The 1859 case of Pattison v. Board of Supervisors of
Yuba County 37 shows the Legislature's
willingness to substitute its judgement for local
officials'. The Legislature mandated the Yuba
supervisors to place on the county ballot a
proposition that required the County to invest
in a railroad. When the Board complied, Mr.
Pattison sued. Pattison, a local landowner,
feared that Yuba County might have to raise his
property taxes if the railroad went bankrupt and
defaulted on the County's investment. County
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attorneys argued that the Legislature could do
anything it wanted as long as the California
Constitution did not specifically prohibit it.
Because counties were the state's agents, they
had no powers that were inherently their own.
Pattison's attorney countered that the
Constitution precluded the state government
from investing in railroads. Further, the counties
were merely agents of the state. Therefore, the
Legislature could not require the County to do
what it could not do itself. This relationship
distinguished counties from cities, they argued,
because "municipal corporations, on the other
hand, are creatures of statutes, but they are also
children of trade." 38
While Mr. Pattison's attorneys were willing to
carve out a more independent role for cities, the
Supreme Court was not. Later in 1859 the Court
ruled in People v. Burr that it was constitutional
for the Legislature to authorize the payment of
clai:ms against San Francisco in a manner that,
in effect, created a new city debt exceeding the
charter limitations on the amount of municipal
debt. 39 This conclusion is all the more surprising
because San FranCisco's charter, like all others of
the period, was itself a legislative act. 40 The
Legislature's action had the effect of telling local
officials how to spend the City's treasury, even
though they had to exceed the debt limits the
Legislature itself had set in the earlier 1850 and
1855 San Francisco charters.
The complicated 1871 case of Sinton v.
Ashbury41 produced a similar outcome for San
Francisco. The Legislature directed the county
judge to pay private individuals out of the
City's treasury for the cost of extending
Montgomery Street. 42 The Legislature overrode
the Governor's veto, but the assessor still
refused the judge's order. The Supreme Court
upheld the validity of the statute that permitted
the Legislature to control municipal funds for
individuals' gains.
The City of Stockton faced one of the most
egregious cases of legislative meddling that
eventually led to home rule charters. In 1869-70,
the Legislature directed the City to ask voters to
donate $300,000 from the municipal treasury to
the Stockton and Visalia Railroad Company to

--------------------------------~
build its line. 43 The bill actually named three
private individuals to the board of trustees
which handled the payment. The Court's
decision in The Stockton and Visalia Railroad v.
The Common Council of the City of Stockton is
significant in its length, covering nearly 60
pages when most of the other decisions in 1871
were less than ten pages. 44 Each of the four
participating Supreme Court justices submitted
his own, separate opinion and each seemed torn
between the structure of the law and his own
sense of fairness. Justice Wallace's lead opinion
even noted the allegations of corrupt
manipulation of the Legislature.45 Nevertheless,
he wrote, the law was constitutional and
Stockton cannot defend its treasury by invoking
the "spirit of the constitution." Justice Crockett
relied heavily on the principle of stare decisis,
that is, deciding a case from an unbroken line of
precedents. Crockett remarked on Wallace's
recital of rulings in other states.46 Justice
Sprague took a similar tack and looked back to
the 1859 Pattison decision. 47 Reluctantl:ft Justice
Temple joined his colleagues in invoking stare
decisis, but wrote that he would like to agree
with Stockton.48 Good intentions
notwithstanding, the City lost and the S.&V.R.R.
won its $300,000.

formerly exercised over them by the
Legislature." 49

Home rule at last. With legislative meddling
constitutionally protected, the only permanent
remedy was to change the Constitution. The
1879 constitutional convention offered the
opportunity, and the resulting document carried
the needed home rule power. The conference
delegates consulted several examples and the
home rule authority came from the Missouri
Constitution which had just been adopted. The
California Constitution of 1879 prohibited
special legislation, banned special act
incorporations, and granted the power to frame
freeholder charters to communities with at least
100,000 people. Only San Francisco qualified in
1879 and local politics kept it from adopting a
freeholders' charter until 1898. When the
Supreme Court reviewed this power in 1880, it
noted that it was "manifestly the intention of
the Constitution to emancipate municipal
government from the authority and control

The 30 years' legacy of legislative interference
produced constitutional protections for home
rule. This home rule doctrine has become a
powerful political myth, invoked to protect
certain interests or to promote others. 50
Nevertheless, home rule would not have
emerged in California without the necessary
evils of legislative mistrust and meddling.

The issues remain. The issues that divided city
officials and legislators in 1849 are still key
points in the debate over the proper roles of
state and local government: property taxes,
special bills, and home rule powers. Local
property tax limits troubled Governor Peter
Burnett in 1849 as much as it has vexed
governors in our own time. Burnett's principal
reason for vetoing Los Angeles' attempt to be
the state's first city was his fear of unbridled
municipal taxes. How ironic to find California's
first intergovernmental controversy re-enacted
130 years later in 1979 as the Jarvis-Gann
Initiative, Proposition 13. Burnett's insistence on
regular procedures for incorporating new cities
finally produced a uniform law, but the tide of
special legislation has never really stopped.
Even though uniform standards inevitably
require adjustment to accommodate unique
circumstances, the California Legislature still
adopts special bills that promote limited
interests. The flagrant abuses before 1879 are
merely the most infamous; today' s special bills
are exceedingly mild by comparison.

California's cities have two origins: a statutory
basis of legal authority and an economic
justification. Their statutory basis is clear from
the legislative history in this brief review. That
cities are centers of economic activity is as
obvious as the history of human settlement.
The early struggle to mate these dual forces
produced municipalities that reflect the
·characteristics of both parents.
California cities truly are creatures of statute
and children of trade.
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